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Although pretrial litigation often seems to render trial on the
merits something of an anti-climax, adversarial adjudication is of
course the focus of the criminal justice system, military or civilian. 1
Once trial on the merits has begun, trial and defense counsel naturally utilize the rules of evidence in the fashion most likely to make
the most of the evidence available to thBm. Yet, as all lawyers are
aware, the period since the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice has brought sweeping changes not only in military
criminal law, but also in the "constitutionalization" of the law of
evidence. Increasingly, considerations of compulsory process and
confrontation play important roles in determining what evidence
can be obtained and used at trial. Accordingly, this article undertakes to review the law applicable to the procurement and admission
of evidence on the merits 2 in the armed forces in light of the Sixth
Amendment rights to compulsory process and confrontation. 3 Such a
review necessarily entails a considerations of matters which are
generally considered procedural, primarily the law applicable to
witness procurement, as well as matters clearly evidentiary in
nature.

1Ironically, the large number of guilty pleas in both civilian and military law often
renders trial on the merits the rarity rather than the usual rule. Notwithstanding this,
the entire criminal justice system is oriented around the contested trial, which thus
supplies a normative standard.
2Although the rules of evidence do apply to sentencing proceedings in the armed
forces, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. ed.), para. 75; Mil. R.
Evid. 1101, this article will deal only with trial on the merits.
3This article will not, therefore, generally address the innumerable questions inherent in the Military Rules of Evidence.
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I. THEBURDENSOFPROOF AND PRODUCTION
Because burdens of proof and production, like presumptions, 4 are
substitutes for evidence and dictate which party must address and
prove an issue, no discussion of the law relating to the procurement
and admission of evidence can be undertaken without consideration
of the burdens of proof and production. In In re Winship, 5 the
Supreme Court held that "the Due Process Clause protects the
accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."6 Winship left open what facts werre necessary "to constitute the crime". The Court appears to have clarified its intent in
Patterson v. New York 7 by holding that the legislature may constitutionally define a crime in whatever fashion it deems desirable and
may then require a defendant proven to have committed the unlawful conduct to carry the burden of proving the application of any
exception to the statute the legislation chooses to recognize.s As a
result, those matters, such as insanity, which excuse the offense but

4 Although the Supreme Court has clearly permitted various forms of presumptions
in criminal cases, whether statutory or common law, Barnes v. United States, 412 U.S.
837 (1973), it has yet to expressly indicate the necessary relationship between the basic
fact and the presumed fact. See id (stating that the court need not choose between the
different tests of "more likely than not" or beyond a reasonable doubt as possession of
stolen property gave rise to the presumed fact of guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt); Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416 (1970) (suggesting need for a
beyond a reasonable doubt standard); Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36 (1969)
(statutory presumption must be more likely than not given the underlying fact); Totv.
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (presumption is invalid if there is no rational
connection between the basic and presumed facts). See generally E. Imwinkelried, P.
Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Criminal Evidence 377-88 (1979). The topic of
presumptions is complex. See generally Allen, Structuring Jury Decisionmaking in
Criminal Cases: A Unified Constitutional Approach to Evidentiary Devices, 94 Harv.
L. Rev. 321 (1980).
5397 u.s. 358 (1970).
6ld. at 364. See also Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318 (1979) (on appeal the
question is whether the evidence of record "could reasonably support a finding of guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt".) Although the Court in Winship refers to "every fact
necessary to constitute the crime," it is clear that that language means that every
"element of the offense must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. See Mullaney v.
Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 698 (1975) (use of the word, "element").
7432 U.S.197 (1977). Compare Patterson v. New York, with Mullaneyv. Wilbur, 421
u.s. 684 (1975).
8432 U.S. at 210. Patterson necessarily limits Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684
(1974). Compare Patterson, 432 U.S. at 210-16, with Mullaney, 421 U.S. at 698-99.
Although this is a reasonable synthesis of the Court's decision in this area, there may
well be limits beyond which neither Congress nor any other legislature may not go.
See, e.g., Allen & DeGrazia, The Constitutional Requirement of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt in Criminal Cases: A Comment Upon Incipient Chaos in the Lower Courts, 20
Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 6-7 (1982) (arguing that the Court could tie the reasonable doubt
requirement to due process standards created by the common law).

4
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which are not part of the statutory definition, need not constitutionally be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; indeed the burden of proof
for these affirmative or special defenses may constitutionally be
placed on the defense. 9 Within the armed forces, however, the Manual for Courts-Martial1° declares:
The burden of proof to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond a reasonable doubt is upon the Government, both
with respect to those elements of the offense which must be
established in every case and with respect to issues involving special defenses which are raised by the evidence. 11
The burden of proof, sometimes referred to as the burden of persuasion, must be distinguished from the burden of production, sometimes referred to as the burden of going forward. The party with the
burden of production has the burden of producing evidence sufficient to raise the issue. This burden may be distinct from the burden
of proof. As already indicated, the Manual for Courts-Martial, for
example, places the burden of production for affirmative or special
defenses primarily on the defense, 12 but, once such a defense is
raised, palces the burden of disproving such a defense on the
government beyond a reasonable doubt. Within the military context,
the difference between the burdens of proof and production can be of
particular importance because the Manual for Courts-Martial
appears to restrict the government from placing the burden of proof
on the defense. 13 No such limitation exists with respect to the burden
of production and, consequently, the defense may lawfully be
required to assert, for example, exceptions to criminality recognized
in punitive regulations. Thus, in United States v. Cuffee, 14 the Court
of Military Appeals held that, when a regulation prohibited possession of a hypodermic syringe with a hypodermic needle unless pos-

9 Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (defendant could be required to prove
insanity beyond a reasonable doubt).
10Manual for Courts-Martial, United States, 1969 (Rev. ed.) [hereinafter cited as
MCM, 1969].
11 MCM, 1969, para. 214.
12/d. The Manual actually places the burden of proof to negate the defense on the
government whenever the defense is "raised by the evidence". Thus, the government's
evidence may itself raise a special defense.
13As an executive order, the Manual is, of course, subject to revision. Its primary
effect at present, given the nature of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 801-940 [hereinafter cited as U.C.M.J.] is to prohibit the armed forces from creating punitive regulations under U.C.M.J., art 92 which place the burden of proof on the
defense.
HlQ M.J. 381 (C.M.A. 1981) (clarifying United States v. Verdi, 5 M.J. 330 (C.M.A.
1980)). See also United States v. Lavine, 13 M.J. 150 (C.M.A. 1982).

5
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sessed in the course of "official duty or pursuant to valid prescription", the defense had the burden of production in that it had to raise
the exceptions via evidence. 15 Once raised, the burden of proof or
persuasion shifts to the government which must disprove the claim
to the exception beyond a reasonable doubt. This division of responsibility, which the court explicitly held constitutional, 16 appears
clearly appropriate in that it is difficult if not impossible for the
government to negate all possibilities of an exception while such
information is peculiarly in the possession of the defense. However,
once the issue is joined and specific, there is no reason not to put the
government to its burden. The result of this allocation of burdens is to
require the defense in such a case to obtain and present evidence
sufficient to raise the issue.I7

II. PROCUREMENT OF EVIDENCE
A. INGENERAL
Congress has declared:
The trial counsel, the defense counsel, and the courtmartial shall have equal opportunity to obtain witnesses
and other evidence in accordance with such regulations as
the President may prescribe. Process issued in courtmartial cases to compel witnesses to appear and testify
and to compel the production of other evidence shall be
similar to that which courts of the United States having
criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue .... 18
In response, the President has, through the Manual for CourtsMartial, directed that process be issued by the trial counsel on behalf
of both the defense and prosecution19 and that defense requests for
witnesses be submitted to the trial counsel with any disagreements
between defense and trial counsel about calling the witnesses to be
resolved by the convening authority. 20 The present system necessari15 10

M.J. at 381.
/d. at 383-84 (citing at 384, Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 518 (1979)).
17 This is not, incidentally, the rule for litigating suppression motions. Under Mil. R.
Evid. 304 (confessions and admissions), 311 (search and seizure), and 321 (eye-witness
identification), the defense is required to raise its issues by an offer of proof rather
than the actual presentation of evidence. See, e.g., Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to
the Manual for Courts-Martial. Analysis of Rule 304(d)(3), reprinted at MCM, 1969,
A18-22.
18 U.C.M.J., art. 46. Article 46 implements the accused's Sixth Amendment right to
compulsory process. United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 704 (A.C.M.R. 1977).
t9MCM, 1969, para. 115.
zoJd. at para. 115a.
16
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ly raises two distinct questions: when will the trial counsel attempt to
obtain evidence, and what means are available to the trial counsel to
do so.

B. THE DECISION TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE
1. In general

a. General procedures

Insofar as witnesses are concerned,21 the Manual for CourtMartial states:
The trial counsel will take timely and appropriate
action to provide for the attendance of those witnesses who
have personal know ledge of the facts at issue in the case for
both the prosecution and the defense. He will not of his own
motion take that action with respect to a witness for the
prosecution unless satisfied that the testimony of the witness is material and necessary .... The trial counsel will
take similar action with respect to all witnesses requested
by the defense, except that when there is disagreement
between the trial counsel and the defense counsel as to
whether the testimony of a witness so requested would be
necessary, the matter will be referred for decision to the
convening authority or to the military judge or the president of a special court-martial without a military judge
according to whether the question arises before or after
the trial begins. A request for the personal appearance of a
witness will be submitted in writing, together with a
statement, signed by the counsel requesting the witness,
containing (1) a synopsis of the testimony that it is
expected the witness will give, (2) full reasons which
necessitate the personal appearance of the witness, and (3)
any other matter showing that the expected testimony is
necessary to the ends of justice .... The decision on request

21 Documentary and other evidence is not fully dealt with in the Manual for CourtsMartial. MCM, 1969, para. 115c deals with documentary and other evidence in control
of military authorities and states that:
If documents or other evidentiary materials are in the custody and
control of military authorities, the trial counsel, the convening authority,
the military judge, or the president of a special court-martial without a
military judge will, upon reasonable request and without the necessity of
further process, take necessary action to effect their production for use in
evidence and, within any applicable limitations (see ... (Military Rules of
Evidence)), to make them available to the defense to examine or to use, as
appropriate under the circumstances.

7
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for a witness on the merits must be made on an individual
basis in each case by weighing the materiality of the testimony and its relevance to the guilt or innocence of the
parties concerned, against the equities of the situation ....
If the convening authority determines that the witness
will not be required to attend the trial, the request may be
renewed at the trial for determination by the military
judge or the president of a special court-martial without a
military judge, as if the question arose for the first time
during the trial.
The trial counsel may consent to admit the facts expected
from the testimony of a witness requested by the defense if
the prosecution does not contest these facts or if they were
unimportant .... 22
Under paragraph 115, the individual trial counsel's decision to
obtain a witness is not subject to review. In actual practice, the
prosecution's decision is subject to the review of the trial counsel's
superiors, usually the staff judge advocate and convening authority,
who may direct the trial counsel not to subpoena or otherwise obtain
a witness for a variety of reasons, 23 including financial ones. The
defense attempt to obtain witnesses is, however, subject to definite
review. Although, pragmatically, the defense may obtain its own
witnesses and call them at trial, it lacks the power to subpoena them
or to pay witness fees or travel costs unless it complies with paragraph 115. Consequently, if the defense desires to escape the constraints of paragraph 115, it is in practice limited in most cases to
local volunteer witnesses. Even then, a failure to comply with paragraph 115 means that the trial counsel is legally blameless if the
witness fails to appear, depriving the defense of a potentially useful
weapon at trial. 24

See text accompanying notes 101-12 infra; MCM, 1969, para. 115a.
Such reasons could include a desire not to interfere with the activities of the
witness, particularly likely when the witness is a highly placed civilian or military
officer, a possibility of revealing classified information, or simply a desire to avoid
delaying the trial.
24 In a highly unusual case, the defense might be able to show it that it has a
substantial interest outweighing the government's interest in knowing the identity of
the defense witnesses. Under these circumstances, the defense should make an ex
parte application to the military judge with the record of the application remaining
sealed until trial.
If the prosecution has failed to obtain a defense witness without cause, the military
judge may take corrective action to include granting a continuance or giving special
instructions to the members. Cj. United States v. Kilby, 3 M.J. 938, 944-45 (N.C.M.R.
1977). Such a result is less likely if the defense fails to comply with paragraph 115.
22

23
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Subject to the potential availability of extraordinary relief, 25 the
decision of the military judge as to the materiality and procurement
of a witness is not subject to interlocutory review. The Court of
Military Appeals has held that "once materiality has been shown the
Government must either produce the witness or abate the proceedings."26 Thus, military operations, expense, or inconvenience can
only delay the trial rather than justifying proceeding without an
otherwise material witness. 27 A witness who cannot be located, however, obviously cannot be produced and trial need not be affected. If
the witness will be unavailable for an indefinite period, presumably
the same result would apply if the absence was not due to action by
the government.

b. Expert witnesses
Because many trials are dependent upon the use of expert testimony, procurement of expert witnesses may clearly critical to a case.
Consequently, expert witnesses are treated specially in the Manual.
Presumably, because of availability and lack of cost, 28 most counsel,
defense or prosecution, utilize government-employed experts. The
Manual for Courts-Martial does contemplate, however, the possible
employment of other experts:
The provisions of this paragraph are applicabfe unless otherwise prescribed by regulations of the Secretary of a Department. When the employment of an expert is necessary
during a trial by court-martial, the trial counsel, in
advance of the employment, will, on the order or permission of the military judge or the president of a special
court-martial without a military judge, request the convening authority to authorize the employment and to fix
the limit of compensation to be paid the expert. The
request should, if practicable, state the compensation that
is recommended by the prosecution and the defense.

U.Cj. Dettinger v. United States, 7 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1979).
26
United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 385-86 (C.M.A. 1976). Accord United
States v. WiiJis, 3 M.J. 94 (C. M.A. 1977). The quoted language has been disclaimed by
Judge Cook as being overbroad. Id. at 96-100 (Cook, J., dissenting).
The court has, however, held that there is no right to cumulative evidence. United
States v. WiiJiams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 (C. M.A. 1977). See generally text accompanying
notes 59-65 infra.
27 In limited circumstances substitutes for live testimony, such as stipulations, may
be acceptable. See generally text accompanying notes 66-79 infra.
28 The prosecution will be concerned with expenditure of government funds while
the defense wiiJ be limited to the funds available to the accused unless the government
can be required to pay an expert's fee under MCM, 1969, para. 116.

9
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When, in advance of trial, the prosecution or the defense
knows that the employment of an expert will be necessary,
application should be made to the convening authority for
permission to employ the expert, stating the necessity
therefor and the probable cost. In the absence of a previous
authorization, only ordinary witness fees may be paid for
the employment of a person as an expert witness. 29
These requirements are in addition to the showing required by paragraph graph 115 of the Manual. Requests for employment of experts
under paragraph 116 of the Manual are rarely successful3° and the
denial of any specific request may raise significant questions of the
rights to compulsory process and fair trial under the Constitution.31
It is important to note, however, that nothing in the Uniform Code of
Military Justice or the Manual of Courts-Martial requires payment
of special fees to obtain the testimony of an expert who happens to be
a witness. Thus, a medical doctor who has previously treated the
accused could be subpoenaed and paid normal witness fees if he or
she were to be questioned about that treatment. The Manual would
appear to require some form of expert fee if the expert were to be
asked to make special preparations for testimony.32
2. Form of the Paragraph 115 request

The Manual for Courts-Martial requires that a request for a
defense witness be in writing and contain a synopsis of the expected
testimony, justification for the personal appearance of the witness,
and any other matter showing that the witness is "necessary to the
ends of justice."33 The request must ordinarily set forth enough
information to establish the "materiality"34 of the expected testimony

29/d. The fees authorized are dependent upon service regulations. In the Navy, for
example: "The convening authority ... will fix the limit of compensation ... on the
basis of the normal compensation paid by United States attorneys for attendance of a
witness of such standing in the United States courts in the area involved." Navy
JAGMAN § 0138k(1).
30See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 22 C.M.A. 424, 47 C.M.R. 402, 404-06 (1973)
(holding that the defense failed to demonstrate necessity for employment of a civilian
psychiatrist).
31 See text accompanying notes 229-377 infra.
32MCM, 1969, para. 116 speaks of "employment of an expert". Accordingly, requiring the expert to perform tests in advance of trial or to make substantial pretrial
preparation would seem to require an expert fee. Similarly, obtaining an expert's
testimony solely to utilize the expert's opinion would seem to constitute "employment''.
33 MCM, 1969, para. 115a.
34 See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 5 M.J. 461,469 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v.
Lucas, 5 M.J. 167, 172 (C.M.A. 1978).

10
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of the witness. 35 In certain circumstances, however, the government
will be held responsible for knowledge within its possession so that
an otherwise deficient paragraph 115 request will be held sufficient. 36 Paragraph 115 necessarily presumes that the defense will be
able to adequate interview37 the witness in order to set forth an
adequate synopsis and the courts may be expected to be particularly
hostile to a witness request made without any contact with the given
witness. 3s Chief Judge Everett has recognized that, in some cases,
such as those in which the witness is a hostile one, the synopsis
requirement cannot be met and "a rigid application of these
requirements would produce a conflict with an accused's statutory
and constitutional right to compulsory process."39 Consequently,
when defense counsel cannot contact a witness who is believed to
have material testimony, that fact should be set forth with an explanation.40 When a defense request for a witness is heard by the military judge, the judge must determine the issue "on the basis of the

35The procedure is recounted in numerous cases. E.g., United States v. Jovan, 3 M.J.
136 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196 (C.M.A. 1975);
United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A.10, 16-17, 37 C.M.R. 274, 280-81 (1967)(Quinn, C.J.,
concurring in part, dissenting part) (request should include synopsis of expected
testimony, logical and legal relevance of evidence); United States v. Powell, 4 M.J. 551
(A.F.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518 (C.G.C.M.R.1977), aff'd, 9 M.J.
285 (C. M.A. 1980); United States v. Green, 2 M.J. 823 (A.C.M.R. 1976); United States
v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584 (A.C.M.R. 1975). A diminished standard of materiality appears to
apply to experts who have prepared government laboratory reports offered against
the accused at trial. United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69 (C.M.A. 1980).
36E.g., United States v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167, 172 (C. M.A. 1978) (staff judge advocate
charged with knowledge of the content of a pretrial statement made by the witness at
the pretrial investigation).
37 Chief Judge Everett appears to believe that some form of contact is generally
necessary, but that that contact need not be an in person interview. United States v.
Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 78 (C.M.A. 1980) (Evertt, C.J., concurring in the result). The
drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence, on the other hand, concluded that the
defense counsel must be afforded the right to an in person interview of potential
witnesses before counsel could be required to raise a suppression motion with specificity. Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of
Rule 304(d)(3), reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-21. Inasmuch as the procurement of a
witness on the merits may be more essential to due process than the procurement of a
witness for a suppression motion, the Military Rules of Evidence necessarily suggest
that the defense be afforded the right to an in person interview before a request for a
witness under paragraph 115 can be held insufficiently justified.
assee, e.g., United States v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584, 586 (A.C.M.R. 1975) (counsel's
representations that two witnesses would give alibi testimony held insufficient when
"not corroborated or verified in any way"); United States v. Carey, 1 M.J. 761,766-67
(A.F.C.M.R. 1975).
39 United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77 (C. M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring in
the result).
4°C/. United States v. Carey, 1 M.J. 761, 767 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975).

11
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matters presented to the judge ... not just that contained in the written request. 41

3. Timeliness
The Manual for Courts-Martial does not prescribe time requirements for filing a request for witnesses under paragraph 115 and the
courts have been surprisingly loathe to hold requests invalid as
untimely. Members of the Court of Military Appeals have clearly
indicated their willingness to consider the timeliness of a defense
request42 and the Courts of Military Review have utilized untimeliness in holding that the defense lacked a right to witnesses.43 However, as of yet, the courts have failed to give any significant guidance
as to what actually constitutes timeliness. The Courts of Military
Appeals has stated in dicta, however, that "while a defense counsel,
for tactical reasons, may properly delay a request for witnesses until
after the charges are referred to trial, he thereby assumes the risk
that ... in the interval the witness may become unavailable to testify
at trial."44 Thus, by awaiting referral of charges, counsel may not
have an untimely submission but may be unable to obtain the
requested witness. An unnecessary delay in filing a request risks
having the request treated as untimely, especially when the delay
results in the transfer of a witness known to the defense to be pending
reassignment. 45 In most cases, given the brevity of most courtsmartial, a request for the procurement of a witness made at trial,

41
United States v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584, 586 (A.C.M.R. 1975) (citing United States v.
Jones, 21 C.M.A. 215, 44 C.M.R. 269 (1972)). See United States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518,
525-26 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977) (Lynch, Jr., concurring in part, dissenting in part); United
States v. Green, 2 M.J. 823,826 (A.C.M.R. 1976). Jones, however, does not necessarily
stand for this proposition since the court in Jones determined the propriety of the trial
judge's ruling on the basis of all the information given to the judge because he
"presumably ... considered it in his ruling." 21 C.M.A. at 217, 44 C.M.R. at 271.
42
See, e.g., United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 72, 78 (C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J. and
Everett, C.J., individually concurring in the result with separate opinions); United
States v. Stocker, 7 M.J. 373, 374 (C.M.A. 1979) (summary disposition) (Cook, J.,
dissenting on the grounds that defense request for witness was untimely).
43
See, e.g., United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661, 664 (A.C.M.R. 1977) (dicta). A theory
of waiver may be applicable. Cf. United States v. Briers, 7 M.J. 776 (A.C.M.R. 1979)
(failure to request lab analyst when judge gave defense right to do so constitutes
waiver); United States v. Mackey, 7 M.J. 649, 654 (A.C.M.R. 1979) (same).
44
United States v. Cottle, 14 M.J. 260, 263 (C.M.A. 1982). The lack of a pretrial
request is not conclusive. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 772, 773 (A.C.M.R.
1977); United States v. Phillippy, 2 M.J. 297, 300 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976).
45
E.g., United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661, 664 (A.C.M.R. 1977) (dicta) (overseas
witness). See also United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631, 646 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev'd on
other grounds, 4 M.J .118 (C. M.A. 1977), affd on remand, 6 M.J. 719 (A.F.C.M.R.1978),
affd, 8 M.J. 190 (C. M.A. 1980) (defense request reviewed during trial implicitly held
to be untimely when request had been withdrawn and lab technician discharged in
interim).
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untimely or otherwise, effectively constitutes a motion for a continuance. When the request is untimely, the decision is discretionary
with the military judge. 46 Nonetheless, if the defense shows that the
witness is material and necessary, the judge should, in the interests
of justice, grant the request. 47 To do otherwise would penalize the
accused the for counsel's conduct and would raise a strong probability of ultimate reversal for inadequacy of counsel.

#. Materiality
The Manual for Courts-Martial requires that a defense request for
a witness give "full reasons which necessitate the personal appearance of the witness, and ... any other matter showing that the
expected testimony is necessary to the ends of justice."48 Perhaps,
because the prosecution is not to procure a prosecution witness on its
own motion unless "satisfied that the testimony of the witness is
material and necessary,"49 the courts have consistently viewed paragraph 115 as requiring that the defense demonstrate the "materiality" of its requested witnesses. 5° The exact meaning of "materiality"
has been unclear. In its evidentiary sense, "materiality" requires at
least that the evidence involved be relevant. 51 It also may mean in any

46See, e.g., United States v. Stocker, 7 M.J. 373,374 (C.M.A.1979) (summary disposition) (Cook, J., dissenting).
•~see, e.g., United States v. Jovan, 3 M.J. 136, 137 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v.
Green, 2 M.J. 823, 826 (A.C.M.R. 1976); United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661, 664
(A.C.M.R. 1977).
4SMCM, 1969, para. 115a.
49[d.
50See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 7 M.J. 284, 285 (C.M.A.1979); United States v.
Wagner, 5 M.J. 461 (C. M.A. 1978); United States v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167 (C. M.A. 1978);
United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196 (C.M.A. 1975); United States v. Marshall, 3 M.J. 1047 (A.F .C.M.R. 177). Cf. United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 31 Crim.
L. Rep [BNA] 3162 (U.S. July 2, 1982) (noting, however at note 9, that the Court
expressed "no opinion on the showing which a criminal defendant must make in order
to obtain compulsory process for securing the attendance ... of witnesses within the
United States.").
51 See, e.g., United States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518, 522-23 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977). Mil. R.
Evid. 401 defines what is often termed, "logical relevance" or the requirement that the
evidence involved have a "tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence.'' Phrased differently, in the case of determining
witness availability, the evidence must tend to negate the prosecution's case or to
support the defense's. United States v. Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196, 197-98 (C.M.A.
1975). "Relevance" has additional scope, however, inasmuch as evidentiary rules
which exclude evidence because of doubt of its probative value, prejudicial impact on
the members, or for other reasons for social policy are often termed rules of "legal
relevance". See, e.g. I. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Criminal
Evidence 62-65 (1979). Mil. R. Evid. 403-05; 407-12 are rules of legal relevance as are
the rules of privilege, Mil. R. Evid. 501-09, and testimony which would be inadmissible
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given case that, considering all of the factors unique to the case, 52 the
evidence is important, 53 a determination which might include the
availability of substitute forms of evidence. 54 Recently, the Court of
Military Appeals has attempted to clarify the issue:
The word "material" appears misused. Obviously a witness' testimony must be material to be admissible ....
However, the terms may have been confused in earlier
cases, the true test is essentiality. If a witness is essential
for the presentation of the prosecution's case, he will be
present or the case will fail. The defense has a similar
right. 55
The use of the word, "essential", can hardly be considered as resolving this question for the term is itself subject to ambiguity. What
degree of probative value is necessary before a prospective witness'
testimony will be "essential"? In past cases, witnesses needed to
establish affirmative defenses such as lack of jurisdiction or selfdefense have usually been considered to be material witnesses 56 as
under them should not ordinarily be "material" for purposes of obtaining witnesses.
But see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973); text accompanying notes 341-72,
373-77 infra-.
52 United States v. Tangpuz, 5 M.J. 426, 429 (C.M.A. 1978).
53 At common law, "materiality" had been given two alternative meanings: that the
evidence is of consequence to the case and that the evidence is of particular probative
value. The paragraph 115 standard includes this latter meaning. See note 55 infra.
54A true materiality standard should not include this factor. To the extent that it
plays a role in the question of making a witness available, see text accompanying notes
66-79 infra, it is because of the phrasing of paragraph 115a, which does not as such
specify "materiality" as the prerequisite for obtaining a witness.
55 United States v. Bennett, 12 M.J. 463,465 n.4 (C.M.A. 1982). In the past, the court,
in determining whether a failure to obtain a requested defense witness necessitated
reversal, stated: "materiality ... must embrace the 'reasonable likelihood' that the
vidence could have affected the judgment of the military judge or court members."
United States v. Hampton, 7 M.J. 284, 285 (C.M.A. 1979) (citing Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972); United States v. Lucas, 5 M.J. 167, 172-73 (C.M.A.
1978)); United States v. Tippit, 7 M.J. 908 (A.F.C.M.R.1979). See Compulsory Process
II, infra note 382, at 222-23 & n.108.
56 See, e.g., United States v. Hampton, 7 M.J. 284 (C. M.A. 1979) (lack of jurisdiction;
witness immaterial when defense counsel had not interviewed him); United States v.
Iturralde-Aponte, 1 M.J. 196 (C.M.A. 1975) (self-defense); United States v. Dawkins,
10 M.J. 620 (A.F .C.M.R. 1980) (insanity defense; witness immaterial when psychiatric
interview with defendant needed and witness does not interview defendant); United
States v. Jones, 6 M.J. 770 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (insanity defense; witness immaterial
when no indication they would retract earlier sanity board opinions); United States v.
Christian, 6 M.J. 624 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (suppression motion; witness immaterial if no
adequate showing that witness remembered incident); United States v. Krejce, 5 M.J.
701 (N.C.M.R. 1978) (lack of jurisdiction); United States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661
(A.C.M.R. 1977) (informant's perjury at Art. 32 investigation, but inadequate showing
of materiality on facts); United States v. Green, 2 M.J. 823 (A.C.M.R. 1976( (alibi);
United States v. Staton, 48 C.M.R. 250 (A.C.M.R. 1974) (no intent to desert); United
States v. Snead, 45 C.M.R. 382 (A.C.M.R. 1972) (entrapment).
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have been defense character witnesses57 when the accused's character has been in issue. 58 While these cases may deal with "essential"
evidence, it is unlikely that the defense could or should be restricted
to witnesses. presenting evidence of such ultimately critical value.
Interestingly, in the May, 1983, Proposed Revision of the Manual for
Courts-Martial, the Joint Service Committee on Military Justice has,
in proposed Rule 703(b)(l), created a potentially more useful standard: "Each party is entitled to the production of any witness whose
testimony on a matter in issue on the merits or an interlocutory
question would be relevant and necessary." The Discussion to the
proposed rule states: "Relevant testimony is necessary when it is not
cumulative and when it would contribute to a party's presentation of
the case in some positive way on a matter in issue." The proposed
Rule is qualified in Rule 703(b)(3), which provides that, notwithstanding Rule 703(b)(l), a party is not entitled to production of a
witness who would be unavailable under Military Rule of Evidence
804(a) unless the witness' testimony "is of such central importance to
an issue that it is essential to a fair trial ... ".The Rule's caveat is not
likely to be of importance except insofar as it incorporates, through
Military Rule of Evidence 804(a)(6), Article 49(d)(2) of the Uniform
Code which, in relevant part, makes a witness unavailable "by reason
of. .. military necessity, ... or other reasonable· cause." Unless this
exception is utilized in an improbably broad fashion, the proposed
Rule appears both more useful and more likely to comply with an
accused's constitutional and statutory rights to obtain and present
evidence than does the court's "essentiality" standard.
5. Cumulative testimony
Inherent in the right to compulsory process is the limitation of
relevancy. 59 Military Rule of Evidence 403 allows evidence to be
57 United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.1977); United States v. Carpenter, 1
M.J. 384 (C.M.A. 1976); United States v. Giermek, 3 M.J. 1013 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977);
United States v. Ambalada, 1 M.J. 1132 (N.C.M.R. 1977). See generally Mil. R. Evid.
404(a)(l), 405(a), (b). When the defendant's character for truthfulness is in issue,
polygraph evidence may be material. Because such evidence has traditionally been
viewed as being logically and legally irrelevant, however, no compulsory process right
to introduce such evidence has been recognized. United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820
(A.F.C.M.R. 1981). A witness who is more credible and articulate is material even
though another witness has already testified to the events. United States v. Jovan, 3
M.J.136 (C.M.A. 1977).
58Mil. R. Evid. 404(a) strictly limits use of character evidence restricting it in most
cases to "[e]vidence of a pertinent trait of the character of the accused .... " Mil. R.
Evid. 404(a)(l). The Analysis of Rule 404 declares that the Rule makes evidence of
good general character inadmissible although it would allow "evidence of good military character when that specific trait is pertinent ... for example in a prosecution for
disobedience of orders." Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for CourtsMartial, Analysis of Rule 404(a), reprinted at MCM, 1969, Al8·61.
s9See note 51 supra.
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excluded, even if logically relevant, 60 "if its probative value is substantially outweighed ... by considerations ... of needless presentation of cumulative evidence." If evidence is cumulative under Rule
403, it is "legally irrelevant" and there is no right to introduce it. 61
The issue of cumulative testimony often arises when character
evidence is sought to be introduced. 62 To establish an adequate
record for appeal, the defense should furnish to the judge the name
and location of each character witness, how long each witness has
known the defendant, the capacity in which the witness knew the
defendant, and the characteristics to which the witness will testify. 63
The standard used in determining cumulativeness is not merely
whether the evidence is repetitive. Instead, the military judge must
"in his sound discretion decide whether, under the circumstances of
the given case, there is anything to be gained from an additional
witness saying the same thing other witnesses have said ... ". 64 If
testimony is declared to be cumulative, the judge should indicate
how many of such witnesses will be subpoenaed at government
expense. Only the defense, though, can decide which witnesses will be
called to testify.6s
6. Alternatives to personal attendance at trial of a witness
The Court of Military Appeals has stated that, even though a
witness is material, personal attendance at trial may be obviated by
other effective alternatives, 66 including depositions, interrogatories,
60Jd.
61 United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 242 (C.M.A. 1977). See United States v.
Staton, 48 C.M.R. 251, 254 (A.C.M.R. 1974); Mil. R. Evid. 402. See note 51 supra for the
definition of "legal relevance." Clearly irrelevant evidence cannot be considered
"essential" evidence under United States v. Bennett, 112 M.J. 463, 465 n.4 (C.M.A.
1982).
62E.g., United States v. Credit, 8 M.J.190 (C.M.A.l980); United States v. Tangpuz, 5
M.J. 426 (C.M.A. 1978); United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C.M.A. 1977); United
States v. Courts, 4 M.J. 518 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977), affd, 9 M.J. 285 (C. M.A. 1980); United
States v. Elliott, 3 M.J. 1080 (A.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Scott, 3 M.J. 1111
(N.C.M.R. 1977). Note that paragraph 115 of the Manual for Courts-Martial was
amended in 1981 so as to generally eliminate live witness testimony on sentencing.
63 See United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A. 10, 16-17, 37 C.M.R. 274, 280-81 (C.M.A.
1967) (Quinn, C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); text accompanying notes
18-20 supra. Note that the trial counsel need not be concerned with this procedure as
the government determines whether to make witnesses available.
64
United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239,243 n.8 (C. M.A. 1977).Accord United States
v. Scott, 3 M.J. 1111, 1113 (N.C.M.R. 1977).
65 United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 n.9 (C.M.A. 1977) (Perry, J., Fletcher,
C.J ., concurring; Cook, J ., dissenting). In an appropriate case, the judge would clearly
be able to make that determination. However, in the usual situation, the decision is for
the defense.
66 United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431,432 (C. M.A. 1978); United States v. Willis, 3 M.J.
94, 98 (C.M.A. 1977)(Cook, J., dissenting). See also United States v. Courts, 9 M.J. 285,
292-93 (C.M.A. 1980).
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and stipulations to the expected testimony of the witness. 67 If the
government is willing to stipulate to the witness' expected testimony,
there may be no need for the witness, 6s especially inasmuch as the
defense may have obtained more through the stipulation than it
would have through live testimony because the government has lost
the chance of rebuttal. The decision to admit alternatives lies in the
discretion of the judge.69 The fundamental issue is whether "the
effect of the form of the testimony under the particular facts and
circumstances of the case will ... diminish the fairness of the proceedings."70 Because the circumstances of each individual case are
extremely important, the judge should explicitly state reasons for
allowing alternative forms of testimony to insure adequate review of
the decision. n
Older cases allowed the judge to use a balancing test in deciding
whether to allow alternatives to the witness' personal appearance. 72
However, a presumption existed that the defense request was to be
granted if it would be "done without manifest injury to the service."73
with military necessity or convenience often being cited as reasons
for refusing to require the personal appearance of the witness. 74 The
Court of Military Appeals, in United States v. Carpenter75 and United
States v. Willis, 76 has overruled that approach. The current standard
requires that the witness' personal appearance turn only on the
materiality of the testimony; 77 military necessity only affects when
the witness can testify. 7S Even though obtaining witnesses for the
61E.g., United States v. Snead, 45 C.M.R. 382,386 (A.C.M.R. 1972) (listing alternatives). See also Proposed Rule of Court-Martial 703(b)(3), Proposed Revision of the
Manual for Courts-Martial (Joint Service Comm. on Military Justice, May 1983).
68 This may be particularly true of some character witnesses. While character
evidence given by the defendant's commanding officer "occupies a unique and favored
position in military judicial proceedings," United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384,386
(C.M.A. 1976), performance ratings, fitness reports, and efficiency reports may be
acceptable substitutes. United States v. Tangpuz, 5 M.J. 426, 430 (C.M.A. 1978).
69United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431, 432 (C.M.A.1978). It should be noted that most of
the cases in which substitutes for live testimony were urged by the government were
cases in which the testimony was offered for sentencing purposes by the defense. With
the revision of the Manual for Courts-Martial to generally eliminate live testimony for
sentencing, see MCM, 1969, para. 75, the number of appellate cases involving a use of
substitutes for live testimony should diminish.
70 United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431, 432 (C.M.A.1978). Thus, if a witness' credibility
is important, live testimony should be required.
71 United States v. Scott, 5 M.J. 431,432 (C.M.A. 1978).
72 United States v. Manos, 17 C. M.A. 10, 15, 37 C.M.R. 27 4, 279 (1967); United States
v. Sweeney, 14 C.M.A. 599, 34 C.M.R. 379 (1964).
73 United States v. Manos, 17 C.M.A. 10, 15, 37 C.M.R. 274,279 (1967).
14See, e.g., United States v. Sweeney, 14 C.M.A. 599, 606, 34 C.M.R. 379, 386 (1964).
1s1 M.J. 384 (C.M.A. 1976).
763 M.J. 94 (C.M.A. 1977).
77 United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 386 (C.M.A. 1976).

1Sfd.
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defense may be inconvenient and costly to the government, the
defendant cannot be compelled to accept a substitute for those reasons alone. 79

7. Defense objections to Paragraph 115
Applying as it does to virtually all defense witnesses, paragraph
115 produces two primary complaints; that the defense must "submit
its request to a partisan advocate for a determination,"80 and that, in
doing so, it necessarily reveals defense strategy and testimony to the
government. 81 Inasmuch as the trial counsel is exempt from any
similar situation, equal protection complaints were also raised.

a. The recipient of the request
As a matter of practice, the prosecution's decision to procure a
witness is subject only to the review of those who have endorsed the
prosecution of the accused, i.e., the staff judge advocate and convening authority. 82 Although the law requires these officers to be neutral
and experience suggests that most make great efforts to carry out
their legal duty, both common sense and experience suggest that an
inherent conflict of interest exists when the defense requests that a
given witness be obtained. 83 Any given witness potentially represents the expenditure of funds8 4 for a purpose contrary to what may be
viewed as the best interest of the given officer or service. A number of
commentators have recognized, for example, that the staff judge
advocate is in effect the chief prosecutor for the convening authority85 and paragraph 115 asks a great deal of such a person. Further-

United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94, 96 (C.M.A. 1977).
United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 386 n.8 (C.M.A. 1976).
81 Disclosure results not only from notice of who the defense wishes to call, but, more
importantly, from the requirement that the defense must show materiality in order to
obtain the witness, a requirement which necessarily reveals defense strategy. See text
accompanying notes 89-95 infra.
82 In most of the armed forces, the prosecutor is rated by these officers, or their
equivalents, and promotion is thus contingent on the prosecutor's compliance with
their wishes.
83See note 85 infra.
84 Budgeting for courts-martial varies within the armed forces with not all services
budgeting specifically for trials. When witness expenses come out of a ship's operating
budget, for example, one can expect the ship's captain who is the convening authority
to be particularly resistant to any expense.
sssee, e.g., Hodson, The Manual for Courts-Martial-1984, 57 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 15
(1972), in which General Hodson, formerly The Judge Advocate General of the Army
and then Chief Judge of the Army Court of Military Review, said: "I would favor
recognizing the staff judge advocate and the commander for what they are. They are
the Government." Indeed, he proposed reorganizing the military criminal legal system so that the "staff judge advocates ... would resemble United States Attorneys." I d.
at8.
79

80
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more, as a matter of law, paragraph 115 declares that the trial
counsel will take action to provide a witness requested by the defense
"except when there is disagreement between the trial counsel and
the defense counsel [as to the necessity for the witness]." In effect, the
trial counsel has a substantial amount of leverage over the defense. 86
The Court of Military Appeals has noted this objection to paragraph
115 and has stated in dicta that "the requirement appears to be
inconsistent with Article 46 ... ".87 More recently, Chief Judge Everett appears to have implicitly rejected this view by stating that "the
Government is entitled to prescribe reasonable rules whereunder it
will have adequate opportunity either to arrange for the presence of
the witness or to explore any legally permissible alternative to the
presence of the witness."8S
The defense may be able to escape the need to advise the prosecution of its requested witnesses by directly requesting the witness
from the military judge. Under present law, this solution would
appear appropriate only when the defense has a substantial interest
in not advising the government of the identify of the witnesses, an
interest which clearly outweighs the government's interest in knowing their identity. Inasmuch as this procedure would of necessity
require the judge to utilize novel procedures to insure that the necessary witness fees could be paid and the subpoena served in the event
of a noncooperative witness, the most probable circumstance justifying this procedure would be a defense showing that a prosecution
member would likely tamper with the witness. In such a unique
circumstance, the military judge should seal the record of the witness request until the conclusion of the witness's testimony.
b. Defense disclosure of tactics and strategy

The defense objection that paragraph 115 necessarily reveals
defense tactics and strategy can be divided into two components: the
86The Court of Military Appeals has said that its application of paragraph 115leaves
"no doubt that an accused's right to secure the attendance of a material witness is free
from substantive control by trial counsel." United States v. Arias, 3 M.J. 436, 438
(C.M.A. 1977). But see United States v. Cottle, 14 M.J. 260, 261 (C. M.A. 1982) (trial
counsel denied the witness request). Trial counsels can and have rejected paragraph
115 requests as being procedurally deficient, however, using the rejection as a tactical
ploy to either discourage the defense from requesting the witness or the judge from
granting the request due to the lateness of the final request or to encourage the defense
counsel to plea bargain.
87 United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 386 n.8 (C.M.A. 1976). Accord United
States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 240 n.2 (C.M.A. 1977).
88 United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A. 1980). Chief Judge Everett
concurred in the result of Vietor only, while Judge Fletcher, also concurring in the
result alone, found Judge Everett's "analysis ... unacceptable." !d. at 78.
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disclosure itself and the lack of reciprocity. Proper compliance with
paragraph 115 will result in a disclosure to the government of all
defense witnesses and a synopsis of their individual testimony.
Although counsel may well believe that they are required to disclose
more than the law actually requires, 89 there is no doubt but that the
quantum actually required, as well as the quantum occassionally
demanded by prosecutors, is enough to be very revealing. The prosecution has no equivalent requirement90 and the broad discovery
available to the defense as a matter of practice can hardly be equated
with the template of the defense case required under paragraph 115.
Any Fifth Amendment objection91 to paragraph 115 appears to be
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in Williams v. Florida. 92
In Williams, the Court sustained Florida's notice of alibi rule against
constitutional self-incrimination objections on the grounds that the
defense was only divulging information which it would have to
reveal at trial. 93 Although Williams appears to require a reciprocal
duty on the party of the government, 94 that requirement is met
simply by making discovery of the prosecution case available to the
defense; 95 response in kind is not apparently required.

c. Lack of reciprocity in general
Defense counsel have contended that paragraph 115 "improperly
discriminates against an accused because it imposes burdens in the
procurement of a defense witness that are not imposed upon the
Government."96 In effect, this is a claimed violation of Article 46 and
a denial of equal protection. Chief Judge Everett may have addressed
See, e.g., United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858, 865 (N.C.M.R. 1980).
90Although the charge sheet, MCM, 1969, App. 5, requires the names and addresses
89

of witness for both the defense and prosecution, that requirement is more honored in
the breach. Further, a command's information as to possible witnesses is something
far different from counsel's actual intent at trial.
9 1Although the Supreme Court's decisions may resolve the Fifth Amendment question, they leave untouched the parallel Article 31, 10 U.S.C. § 831 (1976), the military's
statutory right against self-incrimination, question.
92399 u.s. 78 (1970).

9 3The view has been, in effect, that the information gained by the prosecution is de
minimis and serves the interests of justice and judicial efficiency by avoiding surprise. See generally Van Kessel, Prosecutorial Discovery and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination: Accommodation or Capitulation, 4 Hasting Const. L.Q. 855, 88289 (1977). Inasmuch as the information obtained from the defense may lead the
government to evidence otherwise undiscoverable, at least until the defense portion of
the case, it can hardly be said that the defense material is de minimis. Rather, it may
practically assist the government greatly in making out its case in chief.
94 Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
95ld. See also United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858, 865 (N.C.M.R. 1980) (discovery
afforded defense via Article 32 proceedings more than balances government's discovery from paragraph 115).
96 United States v. Arias, 3 M.J. 436, 438 (C.M.A. 1977).
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this when he stated that paragraph 115 not only provides the
government with an opportunity to explore any permissible alternative to the witness, 97 but also insures that the defense counsel, who
might be spurred as an advocate to request witnesses in the hope that
the delay and expense would result in dismissal or an attractive plea
bargain, have a good faith belief that the testimony will benefit the
accused.9S The Courts of Military Review have justified paragraph
115 as permitting the trial court to avoid cumulative testimony99and
insuring "that government funds are not wasted in producing witnesses who are not absolutely necessary and material. ... "10 0 Although these purposes are praiseworthy, the present procedural
mechanism is not necessary to insure that they are well served.
8. Revision of Paragraph 115.
The primary defense objections to paragraph 115 could be met by
requiring counsel to submit requests to the military judge for resolution. Although this could be done in an ex parte fashion, thus shielding the defense case from the government, the interests of justice
would best be served by requiring service of witness requests on the
opposing party with adversarial litigation before the trial judge.
This would permit the stipulations and concessions that may hasten
the process. Further, it would equalize the parties' information and
permit either side to argue against a given witness request. Such a
system would moot virtually all of the present objections to paragraph 115. Opponents would most likely urge that it would remove
fiscal control from the convening authority and further extend the
power and number of military judges. As to the former, a revised
paragraph 115 could leave the government with the option of funding the witness or dismissing charges, a reasonable, although unpalatable, choice. As to the latter point, a fundamental issue is involved
the resolution of which is dependent on far more than this issue.

C. THEPOWERTOOBTAINEVIDENCE
1. Evidence in the custody or control of military authorities
Although the Proposed Revision of the Manual for Courts-Martial
provides a comprehensive body of discovery rules, 101 modeled in part
United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A. 1980).
9SJd. at 78. See also United States v. Kilby, 3 M.J. 938, 944-45 (N.C.M.R. 1977).
99 United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858, 865 (N.C.M.R. 1980).
100United States v. Christian, 6 M.J. 624, 627 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (DeFord J., concurring). Accord United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C. M.A. 1977).
101 Proposed Rule of Courts-Martial 701, Proposed Revision of th~ Manual for
Courts-Martial (Joint Service Comm. on Military Justice, Department of Defense.
May 1983) [hereinafter cited as Proposed Rules of Courts-Martial].
97
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on the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the present Manual for
Courts-Martial provides little in the way of procedure for obtaining
evidence in military control, other than the testimony of witnesses,
when it declares:
If documents or other evidentiary materials are in the
custody and control of military authorities, the trial counsel, the convening authority, the military judge ... will,
upon reasonable request and "without the necessity of
further process, take necessary action to effect their production for use in evidence and ... to make them available
to the defense to examine or to use, as appropriate under
the circumstances.1o2

The Manual clearly contemplates the voluntary cooperation of others
when a proper officer requests evidentiary materials. It does not
expressly provide a remedy when efforts at voluntary cooperation
fail.l 03 However, given the defense's constitutional right to compul-

IOZMCM, 1969, para. 115c.
The situation should be analyzed from the perspective of the two parties. The
government is usually viewed in a unitary fashion and, if prosecution cannot obtain
needed evidence, it may be reasonable to expect it to get its house in order or suffer the
consequences. Unfortunately, this does place enforcement of the criminal law potentially in the hands of those who may have contrary motives. See, e.g., United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). While great deference should be paid to the government,
especially within the military with its chain of command, given the potential for
obstruction, and the occasional bureaucratic obstacles present when evidence must be
obtained from an unrelated command, the prosecution should not be penalized as a
general rule for an inability to obtain voluntary cooperation in evidence production.
When the defense is unable to obtain needed evidence, a different situation results
because of the accused's constitutional rights to confrontation, compulsory process,
and fair trial. The question then becomes one of remedy. The law does not guarantee
an accused the right to a trial to clear his or her name, but see U.C.M.J. art. 4
(dismissed officer's right to trial by court-martial), and the accused can be protected
by dismissal of charges or abatement of trial rather than by, an order to obtain needed
evidence.
This omission is rectified by Proposed Rule of Court-Martial 701(g)(3), which provides that:
[T]he Military judge may take one or more of the following actions:
(A) Order the party to permit discovery;
(B) Grant a continuance;
(C) Prohibit the party from introducing evidence or raising a defense
not disclosed; and
(D) Enter such order as is just under the circumstances.
Although the Rule further provides that it "shall not limit the right of the accused to
testify in the accused's behalf," its provision permitting the judge to prohibit the
defense from raising an undisclosed defense raises troubling constitutional questions
which the Supreme Court expressly chose not to explore in Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 83 n.14 (1970). Although the Court declared in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S.
470, 472 (1973) that "the Due Process Clause ... forbids enforcement of alibi rules
unless reciprocal discovery rights are given to criminal defendants", it did not reach
103
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sory process, the power to obtain evidence granted by the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, 104 and the express powers granted by the
Manual to the military judge to call witnesses 105 and require additional evidence, lOG it seems apparent that the power exists in at least
the military judgel07 to order the production of evidence in military
custody. In the event of noncompliance with such an order, however,
the only meaningful sanctions may be to abate the proceedings 108 and
perhaps prefer criminal charges against those refusing to comply. 109
When witnesses are involved, the Manual states that, customarily,
the attendance of a witness stationed near enough to trial so "that
travel at government expense will not be involved, will ordinarily be
obtained by notification, oral or otherwise, by the trial counsel, to the
person concerned .... In order to assure the attendance of the person,
the proper commanding officer should be informally advised so that
he can arrange for the timely presence of the witness."110 The Manual
continues by stating that if formal notice is required, "the trial
the question of how, if at all, Oregon's notice of alibi rule could be enforced. 412 U.S. at
472. n.4.
104 U.C.M.J. art. 46.
IOSMil. R. Evid. 614(a).
106 MCM, 1969, para. 54b. Paragraph 54b declares in relevant part that:
The court is not obliged to content itself with the evidence adduced by the
parties. When that evidence appears to be i;nsufficient for a proper
determination of the matter before it or when not satisfied that it has
received all available admissible evidence on an issue before it, the court
may take appropriate action with a view to obtaining available additional evidence.
Paragraph 54b does not explicitly address how the evidence shall be obtained and
continues to illustrate its point by stating: "The court may, for instance, require the
trial counsel. .. to summon new witnesses .... " Given the express power to call witnesses granted by Mil. R. Evid. 614(a), however, it is clear that the Manual is not
relying solely on the voluntary cooperation of military personnel.
107 MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1) authorizes the trial counsel to subpoena civilian witnesses. Although the provision could be read as limiting the trial counsel's power to
subpoena to civilians, it seems more likely that the Manual's drafters took for granted
government compliance with paragraph 115c and simply granted express power to
deal with the case of civilians. However, to the extent that the Manual fails to grant
subpoena power to compel military production of evidence, it seems clear that the
Manual necessarily grants such power to the military judge. In United States v.
Toledo, 15 M.J. 255, 256 (C. M.A. 1983), the court held that the trial judge erred by
refusing to order the prosecution to obtain a transcript of a prosecution witness' prior
federal district court testimony for impeachment use.
108 United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v. Carpenter, 1
M.J. 384 (C.M.A. 1976). See also n.26 supra.
10 9A refusal to supply evidence pursuant to either paragraph 115c or a court order
may constitute a violation of Articles 98 or 134. Cf. United States v. Perry, 2 M.J.l13,
116 (C.M.A. 1977) (Fletcher, C.J ., concurring) (violation of speedy trial right); United
State v. Powell, 2 M.J. 6, 8 (C. M.A. 1976) (unnecessary delay in completing Article 32
proceedings). Refusal to obey a court order may also constitute a disobedience under
Articles 90 and 92.
IIOMCM, 1969, para. 115b.
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counsel will, through regular channels, request the proper commanding officer to order the witness to attend.m Notwithstanding its
phrasing, the Manual does not appear to intend that the commanding officer of the accused has any discretion to reject the request in
general. The decisions of the Court of Military Appeals treat the
government in a unitary fashion and when a material defense witness is not made available, trial must be abated until the witness is
available. 112 The court has implicitly recognized that witnesses may
not be instantly available and that, in normal practice, reasonable
needs of the individual or the service are accommodated.
2. Evidence not in military control
Although most civilian evidence is obtained through the voluntary
cooperation of the appropriate individuals, recourse to process is
occasionally necessary, and Congress has provided that:
Process issued in court-martial cases to compel witnesses
to appear and testify and to compel the production of other
evidence shall be similar to that which courts of the United
States having criminal jurisdiction may lawfully issue
and shall run to any part of the United States, or the
territories, Commonwealths, and possessions. 113
At the outset, it is apparent that process is unavailable if it would
reach abroad, except for the "territories, Commonwealths, and possessions,"114 and the Manual states: "In foreign territory, the attendance of civilian witnesses may be obtained in accordance with existing agreements or, in the absence thereof, within the principles of
international laws." 115 Further, courts-martial lack the power to
compel the attendance abroad of witnesses who could be compelled to
attend courts-martial tried within the United States. 11G
lll]d.
112

See note 108 supra. In an appropriate case, dismissal of charges may be necessary.
uau.C.M.J., art. 46.
114 Presumably, a court-marta! could constitutionally be given the power to subpoena United States citizens outside the United States to trials taking place within the
United States. Civilian federal courts have such power. 28 U.S.C. § 1783 (1976); Fed.
R. Crim. P. 17(e)(2).
115
MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1). The Manual also states that "in occupied enemy
territory, the appropriate commander is empowered to compel the attendance of a
civilian witness in response to a subpoena issued by the trial counsel." I d.
116 United States v. Bennett, 12 M.J. 463,471 (C.M.A. 1982) (courts-martial lack the
statutory power to require a United States citizen to testify abroad before a courtmartial); United States v. Daniels, 23 C.M.A. 94, 96-97, 48 C.M.R. 655, 657-58 (1974)
(courts-martial lack power to compel testimony of U.S. citizen military dependent
residing in the same nation in which the court-martial takes place); United States v.
Potter, 1 M.J. 897, 899 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976) (court-martial could not compel American
witness to testify in Germany); United States v. Boone, 49 C.M.R. 709, 711 (A.C.M.R.
1975) (American witness could not be compelled to testify in Germany).
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Compulsory process is available in two forms: subpoena and warrant of attachment. The subpoena compels the attendance of a witness by the coercion of law while a warrant of attachment results in
the apprehension of the witness and his or her coerced physical
transportation to trial.
a. Subpoenas
Pursuant to Article 46 ofthe Uniform Code of Military Justice, the
Manual for Courts-Martial provides for the issuance of subpoenas by
the trial counsel to compel the attendance of civilian witnesses. 117 The
Manual provides a model subpoena form 118 and states that service
should generally be made by mail. 119 The trial counsel is required to
"take appropriate action with a view to timely and economical service when formal service is necessary. 120 According to the Manual,
personal service "ordinarily will be made by persons subject to military law, but may legally be made by others." 121 Service by United
States marshals has occasionally been used in lieu of service by
military personnel. In the event of noncompliance with the subpoena,
the witness is subject to criminal prosecution in a United States
district court under the provisions of Article 47 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. 122 Such a sanction is not particularly useful
insofar as obtaining the testimony of the witness is concerned. Given
a witness who refuses to comply, the trial counsel may request a
United States district court to direct the attendance of the witness or,
more directly, may issue a warrant of attachment.
117MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1). Insofar as summary courts-martial are concerned,
paragraph 79b states that a summary court has the same power as a trial counsel to
obtain evidence. See also Proposed Rule of Court-Martial 703(e)(2).
11SMCM, 1969, A17-1.
11 9The Manual also states that the witness should ordinarily be advised that voluntary compliance with the subpoena will not prejudice the rights of a witness to fees and
mileage and that a voucher for such fees will be paid after completion of testimony.
MCM, 1969, para. 115d(1).
12flJd.
121Jd.
122Article 47 penalizes an individual, not subject to court-martial jurisdiction, who
having been properly subpoenaed "willfully neglects or refuses to appear, or refuses to
qualify as a witness or to testify or to produce any evidence which that person may
have been legally subpoenaed to product," U.C.M.J., art. 47(a)(3), and provides a
maximum punishment of"a fine of not more than $500, or imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both." I d. at art. 47(b). A prerequisite condition for an Article 47
prosecution is that the witness has been "duly paid or tendered the fees and mileage of
a witness at the rates allowed to witnesses attending the courts of the United States."
!d. at art. 47(a)(2). See also MCM, 1969, para.l15d(2). Interestingly, the Code appears
to deprive the civilian prosecutor of any prosecutorial discretion as Article 47(c)
states: "The United States attorney ... shall, upon the certification of the facts to him
by the military court .•. file an information against and prosecute any person violating
this article." This is not to say that the prosecution would necessarily comply with
article 47. See, e.g., C. Lederer, The Military Warrant of Attachment 1 n.6 (1982).
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b. The warrant of attachment1zs
1. In general

The warrant of attachment, usually known as a bench warrant in
civilian practice, directs the seizure of a witness who has refused to
appear before a court-martial and orders the production of the witness before the tribunal the process of which has been disobeyed. The
attachment prerogative has existed almost as long as the power of
compulsory process 124 and may be regarded as inherent to compulsory process. 125 The express authority of courts-martial to attach
civilian witnesses first appeared in Army general orders in 1868126
and, virtually unchanged since that date, was incorporated into the
modern Manual for Courts-Martial.127 The power to attach is not
found expressly in the Uniform Code of Military Justice, but attachment is authorized by the Manual for Courts-Martial, which
provides:
In order to compel the appearance of a civilian witness in
an appropriate case, the trial counsel will consult the convening authority, the military judge, or the president of a
special court-martial without a military judge, according
tow hether the question arises before or after the court has
convened for trial of the case, as to the desirability of
issuing a warrant of attachment under Article 46.
When it becomes necessary to issue a warrant of attachment, the trial counsel will prepare it and, when practicable, effect execution through a civil officer of the United
States. Otherwise, the trial counsel will deliver or send it
for execution to an officer designated for the purpose by
the commander of the proper army area, naval district, air
command, or other appropriate command. 128
123Much of the following text and accompanying footnotes are taken from Lederer,
Warrants of Attachment-Forcibly Compelling the Attendance of Witnesses, 98 Mil. L.
Rev. (1983), written by Major Calvin M. Lederer, Instructor, The Judge Advocate
General's School, U.S. Army. The authors gratefully acknowledge Major Lederer's
permission to utilize his outstanding article so extensively. Those interested in this
general topic are urged to read his comprehensive treatment of the topic.
124See, e.g., 12 Op. Atty. Gen. 501 (1868).
125
See, e.g., Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); United
States v. Caldwell, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 333 (1795). See also 9 Op. Atty. Gen. 266 (1859).
126 General Orders No. 93, Headquarters of the Army (Nov. 9, 1868). See also J.
Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 202 n.46 (1886, 1920 reprint); Digest of
Opinions, The Judge Advocate General490 (1880).
127MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3).
123Jd.
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The Manual for Courts-Martial places the full discretion and
responsibility for issuance of the warrant in the trial counsel, subject
only to the requirement for consultation with, rather than approved
by, the appropriate officer. By placing authority in the trial counsel
to issue the warrant, the Manual obviously contemplates that the
warrant can only issue after referral of charges. 129 The Manual
authorizes issuance any time thereafter, even before the court actually convenes.
The Manual does not state when a warrant of attachment may
issue. Instead, it provides only that it is to be used in an appropriate
case.I3o In context, it is clear that a warrant of attachment should be
used only to obtain a material 131 witness who will not comply with a
subpoena. Although the better practice is to attempt service of a
subpoena first and to resort to a warrant of attachment only after the
witness refuses to comply, nothing in the Manual for Courts-Martial
necessarily suggests that the issuance of a subpoena or an actual
refusal to appear is a prerequisite to issuance of a warrant. The
Manual's criterion appears to primarily be one of necessity. 132 This
raises an interesting policy question. In civilian practice, bench
warrants are generally issued after witnesses fail to appear. Yet,
civilian courts also utilize material witness statutes to order the
arrest of witnesses likely to attempt to evade testifying. Although
bench warrants are utilized for those witnesses who have not
appeared, while material witness provisions are used for those who
may not appear, the two procedures are obviously related in that they
both provide for the procurement and preservation of witness testimony. At present, the armed forces have a bench warrant procedure which might theoretically be utilized as a material witness
provision. Proposed Rule for Courts-MartiaP33 703(e)(2)(G) and its
Discussion will condition issuance of the warrant of attachment to
129 A court-martial is convened by the officer designated as a convening authority
who details the trial counsel (prosecutor) to the court-martial pursuant to U.C.M.J.
art. 27. The term "convened" in MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3), is somewhat inartful
because it obviously does not refer to the action ofthe convening authority in creating
the court but rather to the point at which the court is called into session as there is no
power to subpoena, much less attach, until there is a court-martial in being for which
process can issue, it is not until after the court is "convened" and charges in a specific
case are referred to it that process can issue.
130/d..
131 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
132MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3), speaks of: "When it becomes necessary to issue a
warrant of attachment." The civilian case law relating to arrest of material witnesses
makes it clear that non-compliance with a subpoena is not a condition prerequisite to
issuance of an arrest warrant. See, e.g., Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir.
1971).
133See note 101 supra.
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cases in which the witness neglects or refuses to appear. Although
this may well be desirable both for reasons of policy related to
military-civilian relations and to forestall raising serious constitutional questions, it should be clear that the proposed revision will
foreclose a possible avenue for obtaining evidence before courtsmartial.
Procedurally, the Manual does not prescribe the form of the warrantl34 and, although the Manual directs the trial counsel to accompany the warrant with supporting documents, 135 that requirement is
intended to support the government's position in the event of a
habeas corpus petition136 and does not appear to be a formal condition
to be met before the warrant may issue.

2. Execution of the warrant
Execution of the warant is to be effective "when practicable ...
through a civil officer of the United States."137 The civil officer
contemplated by the Manual is United States marshal.I38 Failing
service by a marshal, execution is by a military officer "designated
for the purpose by the commander of the proper army area, naval
district, air command, or other appropriate command."139 The Manual contemplates that force may be necessary for the successful
execution of the warrant, 14o although no statute or other executive
order expressly allows the use of force on or permits the deprivation
134The Manual prescribes no specific form for the warrant although earlier Manuals
did so. See, e.g., MCM, 1921 at 655; MCM, 1928 at 88. The present form, DD Form 454,
is prescribed by the Department of Defense.
135
[T]he warrant of attachment will be accompanied by the orders convening the court-martial, or copies thereof; a copy of the charges in the case,
including the order referring the charges for trial, each copy certified by
the trial counsel to be a full and true copy of the original; the original
subpoena, showing proof of service of a copy thereof; a certificate stating
that the necessary witness fees and mileage have been duly tendered; and
an affidavit of the trial counsel that the person being attached is a
material witness in the case, that the person has willfully neglected or
refused to appear although sufficient time has elapsed for that purpose,
and that no valid excuse has been offered for the failure to appear. MCM,
1969 para. 115d(3).
13GMCM, 1969, para. 115d(3).
137/d.
136U .S. Dep't of Army, Pamphlet No. 27-2, Analysis of Contents Manual for CourtsMartial, United States 1969, Revised Edition 23-2 (1970). In 1980, the Director of the
Federal Marshal Service was directed by the Department of Justice to·assist the
armed forces with the execution of warrants of attachment.
139MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3).
140
In executing this process, it is lawful to use only so much force as may be
necessary to bring the witness before the court. When it appears that the
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of liberty of a civilian by military authority. 141

3. Constitutionality of the military warrant of attachment
Clearly, the apprehension by military authorities of a civilian
witness who is not the subject of criminal charges is troubling and
raises a number of constitutional questions, among the most important of which are the following:
(1) Whether any innocent citizen may be arrested to obtain

testimony?
(2) Whether military authorities may apprehend a civilian to

obtain testimony at a court-martial?
{3) What quantum of proof is necessary before a warrant of
attachment may issue?
(4) Who may issue a warrant of attachment?
The first of these questions must be considered resolved; twentyseven states expressly utilize variations of the warrant of attachment142 and all states subscribe to the Uniform Act to Secure the
Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings.143 The fundamental concept of the arrest of material witnesses
is also accepted throughout the American judicial system. 144
Although it could be said that warrants of attachment directing the
attachment of civilians might better be placed in the hands of civilianjudicial authorities, the only court which has considered the issue
to date 145 has clearly rejected that position. 146 The last two questions,
however, raise issues of substantially greater legal import.
use of force may be required or when travel or other orders are necessary,
appropriate application to the proper commander for assistance or for
orders may be made by the officer who is to execute the process. MCM,
1969 para. 115d(3).
141 Despite the introduction of several bilis over a' period of years, Congress has
declined to enact legislation specifically giving military personnel arrest power over
civilians by statute. The most recent bill ofthis kind was S. 727, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) which would have authorized the Secretary of Defense "to invest officers ... of
the Department of Defense ... with the power to arrest individuals on military facilities and installations."
t42Lederer, supra note 123, at 12-13, n.49.
143The Act provides that a host state must honor an order from another state
directing that a given witness be taken into custody.
144 See note 125 supra. See also Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933 (9th Cir. 1971).
145 United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
146The court in Shibley addressed the issue of whether a Marine Court oflnquiry had
the same power to compel attendance as did a court-martial. In resolving that issue, it
also addressed the issue of the warrant of attachment as Shibley had been apprehended and brought before the court of inquiry. The court stated:
If the only method of making this provision (authorizing the summoning
of witnesses) effective were resort to prosecution under (Article 47), the
result would be ineffective and illusory. Punishment as an offense cannot
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Although the Supreme Court has held that "a subpoena to appear
before a grand jury is not a 'seizure' in the Fourth Amendment
sense," 147 it is apparent that the actual apprehension of an individual
and his or her involuntary physical removal to testify148 at a courtmartial necessarily constitutes such a seizure. 149 Except for a limited
number of exceptions, the Fourth Amendment commands that seizures be based upon probable cause and at least one court has held
that a seizure of a material witness must be based upon probable
cause. 150 This conclusion seems correct and fully applicable to the
military warrant of attachment. What is less clear, however, is what
probable cause must establish. In the normal attachment case, the
absence of the subpoenaed witness at trial is apparent and is more
than enough to support the issuance of a warrant insofar as it is
necessary to procure that person's attendance. 151 Yet, the Manual for
Courts-Martial contemplates only the attachment of a witness who
will give "material" testimony. 152 Accordingly, it would seem reasonable to require that the materiality of the witness be demonstrated
prior to the issuance of the warrant, although it might be argued that
a subpoena need not be based on probable cause153 and will be considered valid until properly voided by the court. 154 Accordingly, lack of

compel disclosure to make an inquiry effective. And if boards of inquiry
are to perform their functions ... , they can do so if only if means exist to
bring summarily recalcitrant witnesses before them. And the warrant of
attachment traditionally provides such means. The suggestion has been
made that only civil courts can compel appearance ... after a civilian
witness' refusal. ... This remedy, if it existed, would be equally visionary. It would tie the military tribunals to the civil courts contrary to the
spirit of military law. More, there is notin the (Uniform Code of Military
Justice) a provision similar to (other statutes unrelated to the military
which require resort to federal judges to enforce agency subpoenas). Its
absence indicates that the means to compel attendance must exist in the
court of inquiry itself. Otherwise, the courts are given the naked power to
summon, but no power to use a summary method to compel attendance.
United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734, 743 n.19 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
147 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 9 (1973).
I4Sin order to secure the necessary testimony, the witness may be required to travel
and may necessarily be held in custody for at least a few days.
149See, e.g., United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1973) (distinguishing the
subpoena situation, in which the coercion is the force of law, from detentions of the
individual affected by the police); Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933,942 (9th Cir.
1971).
!SOJd. at 943.
151See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 574 F.2d 352, 355 (6th Cir. 1978).
152See note 131 supra.
153United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973).
1S4Cj. Dolman v. United States, 439 U.S. 1395, 1395 (1978) (Rehnquist, Circuit
Justice) ("invalidity of an injunction may not ordinarily be raised as a defense in
contempt proceedings for its volation"); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 305,
315-20 (1967); United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258,293-94 (1947).
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materiality may only be raised by the prospective witness via a
motion to quash the subpoena. Although the issue is a close one, as a
matter of policy, the better course is to demonstrate materiality of
the witness on a preponderance basis when seeking a warrant of
attachment. It should be simple for counsel to demonstrate materiality in view of the fact that the Manual presently requires the defense
to demonstrate materiality and the government to only call material
witnesses 155 and because of both the dislocation to the witness and the
nature of the military intrusion into civil matters caused by the
warrant. Proof of materiality should clearly be required when a
warrant is to be issued for an individual who has not been subpoenaed. In such a case, the prosecution should demonstrate not only
materiality but also that the witness is not likely to comply with the
subpoena. 156
The last matter to be resolved is the question of who should grant
the warrant of attachment. At present, the Manual specifies that the
warrant should be issued by the trial counsel. 157 The Supreme Court
has, however, declared search warrants issued by prosecutorsl58 to
be unconstitutional and declared that issuing officers must be neutral and detached. "Whatever else neutrality and detachment might
entail, it is clear that they require severance and disengagement
from activities of law enforcement."159 As warrants of attachment
result in the seizure of civilians, there is no justification for application of the argument of military necessity to their seizure. Although
placing the warrant of attachment power in the hands of the trial
counsel is historically understandable in view of the fairly recent
advent of the military judiciary, 160 there is no justification at present
for issuing a warrant of attachment by a prosecutor.
In summary, the present procedure for the issuance of a military
warrant of attachment provides an unusual tool to secure the testimony of unwilling civilian witnesses. In its present form, however, it
must be viewed as flawed and almost certainly unconstitutional.
Given this result, a trial counsel could likely moot any constitutional
complaints by applying to a military judge for permission to issue a

See text accompanying notes 22-27, 48-58 supra.
See Bacon v. United States, 449 F.2d 933, 943 (9th Cir. 1971).
I57MCM, 1969, para. 115d(3).
158 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971) (state attorney general could not
issue search warrant notwithstanding state statute authorizing him to issue warrants
as a justice of the peace).
I59Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972).
160Military judges were not required at special courts-martial, for example, until
1969.
155

156
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warrant of attachment, proving in the process on a preponderance
basis that the desired witness is a material witness and, when
appropriate, that it is more probable than not that the witness will
not comply with a subpoena.

3. Immunity
a. In general
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a valid claim to the
privilege against self-incrimination may be overcome by a grant of
immunity. 161 Accordingly, when the prosecution 162 seeks the testimony of a witness who will claim the constitutional or statutory163
privilege, it may compel the individual's testimony through a grant
of immunity. Although the armed forces have claimed the power to
grant immunity since at least 1917, 164 no statute presently exists165 or
has ever existed that authorizes the armed forces to grant immunity.
Dealing with this issue in 1964 in United States v. Kirsch166 the Court
of Military Appeals held that it perceived "a Congressional grant of
power to provide immunity from prosecution in the provisions of the
Uniform Code; and a valid delineation of a method by which to
exercise the power in the Manual for Courts-Martial ... " 167 In
Kirsch, the court reasoned that, inasmuch as the Uniform Code
provides the convening authority the power to overturn a conviction, 168 and thus through the right against double jeopardy the power
to absolutely protect an accused from criminal sanction, a convening
authority need not actually try an accused and overturn a conviction
to grant immunity to a service member. 169 The court also noted that
Congress was well aware of the various Manuals for Courts-Martial
and regulations providing for immunity and had failed to object to
161 See, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Brown v. Walker, 161
U.S. 591 (1896). See generally, Green, Grants of Immunity of Military Law, 53 Mil. L.
Rev. 1, 3-16 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Green]. See also Green, Grants of Immunity
and Military Law 1971-1976, 73 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1976).
1621nsofar as the ability of the defense to obtain immunity for defense witnesses is
concerned, see text accompanying notes 392-99 infra.
163 U.C.M.J. art. 31. See generally, Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services,
72 Mil. L. Rev. 1 (1976). See also Mil. R. Evid. 301-05.
164 Green, supra note 161, at 17 (citing MCM, 1917); Proposed Rule for CourtsMartial 907(d)(2)(D)(ii).
165 Green, supra note 161, at 17. B1{t see the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970,
discussed at note 173 and accompanying text, which has limited application.
16615 C.M.A. 84, 35 C.M.R. 56 (1964).
161Id. at 90-91,35 C.M.R. at 62-63.
168
See U.C.M.J. art. 64 ("convening authority may approve only such findings of
guilty, and the sentence ... as he finds correct in law and fact and as he in his discretion
determines should be approved.")
16915 C. M.A. at 92, 35 C.M.R. at 64.
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the military's interpretation of the law. 170 Although expressly recognizing the power of a convening authority to grant immunity, the
court made it clear that immunity could not be granted for offenses
over which military courts lackjurisdiction 171 and thus, implicitly, a
convening authority cannot grant immunity to persons not subject to
trial by court-martial. 172 Although Kirsch remains the dispositive
case in this area, enactment of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970 173 complicated matters substantially. The Act centralized in
the Attorney General the federal government's power to grant
immunity and could be read to have deprived the armed forces of any
general power to grant immunity due to the absence of express
reference to courts-martial. Although the military departments
may, as federal agencies, obtain the Attorney General's permission
to grant immunity to a witness, 174 one commentator, after a thorough
examination of the legislative history of the Act, can find no reason to
believe that the Act was intended to affect the armed forces in any
other fashion. 175 Notwithstanding this, Justice Rehnquist, then
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, having opined
that courts-martial constitute "proceedings before an agency" within
the meaning of the Act but that Act had not repealed the armed
forces powers to grant immunity under Kirsch, stated that immunity
could not be granted without the consent of the Attorney General in
any case in which the Department of Justice might have an interest.176 Such a result, although in accord with the Act's spirit, hardly
seems possible in view of the finding that the Act did not repeal the
military's power to grant immunity and the absence in the legislative
history of any intent to affect the armed forces.

170!d. at 94, 35 C.M.R. at 66. The present Manual provisions referring to immunity
are MCM, 1969, para. 68h and Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1). Only a general court-martial
convening authority may grant immunity within the armed forces. MCM 1969, para.
68h; United States v. Villines, 13 M.J.46, 53 (C.M.A.1982); United States v. Joseph, 11
M.J. 333, 334 (C.M.A. 1981). But see United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 61-62
(C.M.A. 1982) (Everett, C.J. dissenting). Immunity may be granted, of course, by the
Attorney General pursuant to statute.
11115 C.M.A. at 96, 35 C.M.R. at 68.
172Immunity may be granted to such persons pursuant to the Organized Crime
Control Act of 1970, 18 U .S.C.§§ 6001-05 (1976). See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 14
M.J. 483,485-86 (C.M.A. 1983).
17318 u.s.c §§ 6001-05 (1976).
174 /d. at 6001, 6004.
175Green, supra note 161, at 29-31.
176 Coast Guard Law Bulletin No. 413 setting forth the 22 September 1971 memorandum of the Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel (William H.
Rehnquist), reprinted in part in VI Criminal Law Materials 32-50 (The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S. Army 1981). For the procedure to obtain such a grant, see
note 217 infra.
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At present, the assumption is that Congress has implicitly granted
the armed forces the power to grant immunity to any service
member who may be tried by court-martial for the offense about
which the member will testify, but that the immunity must be
obtained under the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 whenever
the case has Department of Justice interest. Given Justice Rehnquist's findings, the latter requirement albeit an excellent policy
decision, appears a legal nullity. The real question is whether the
armed forces in fact have power to grant immunity. 177 Assuming
that federal statute has not deprived the military of that power, one
must reexamine Kirsch. Concededly, the court's holding in Kirsch is
unusual and somewhat tortured and the court need not have concluded as it did. The court could easily have held that, although a
convening authority could in effect grant immunity, the Code did not
authorize the issuance of such a grant absent trial. 178 The weight of
legal history does support Kirsch, however, and, as the armed forces
are part of the federal government, it would also appear reasonable
to conclude that a grant of transactional immunity179 properly issued
by the armed forces is binding on the remainder of the federal
government and the states. 18° Any future revision of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice should resolve this matter, however, by
creating express statutory authority for the armed forces to grant
immunity. At present, the military system is clearly vulnerable to
challenge in the federal district courts.

177But see United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 61 (C.M.A. 1982) (Everett, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that the assumption that the 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-05 (1976) did not
preempt the military's power to grant immunity "is not indisputable.").
178See Green, supra note 161, at 26-27.
179Kirsch dealt with a grant of transactional immunity. Although not fully resolved,
it appears that the armed forces may use grants of testimonial immunity as well as
grants of transactional immunity. See text accompanying notes 18-136 infra.
180 U.C.M.J. art. 76. In relevant part, Article 76 declares that "the proceedings ... of
courts-martial as approved, reviewed, or affirmed as required by this chapter ... are
final and conclusive." This interpretation of Article 76 may be erroneous in that the
Article clearly is intended to deal with the finality and effects of convictions. Given
that immunity in the armed forces is ultimately based upon the effects of Articles 64,
76, and the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, however, Article 76
might reasonably be interpreted to reach this far. If not, a grant of immunity in the
armed forces should act to bar the use of testimony, and the product thereof, by a state
or the federal government. New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979) (grand jury
testimony given pursuant to a grant of immunity was involuntary and could not be
used for impeachment of the declarant at his later trial); Murphy v. Waterfront
Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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b. The nature of the immunity required
(1}. In general
Following civilian precedent, military grants of immunity extended transactional immunity181 until the Supreme Court's decision in
1972 in Kastigar v. United States that only testimonial immunity1B2
was necessary to overcome the Fifth Amendment privilege. The
ability of the armed forces to grant testimonial immunity since
Kastigar has been unclear. The promulgation of the Military Rules
of Evidence expressly authorized the granting of use immunity,l83
but the President's rule making power under Article 36 of the Code 184
does not extend to violating congressional statute; members of the
armed forces have been granted a statutory right against selfincrimination which has frequently been held to be broader than the
Fifth Amendment privilege. 185 The legislative history of the statutory privilege suggests that, in relevant part, it was indeed intended
to merely echo the Fifth Amendment privilege, 186 in which case the
Court's holding in Kastigar would clearly apply to the armed forces.
However, the holdings of the Court of Military Appeals create some
uncertainty. Until fairly recently, the court repeatedly held that the
statutory right was more protective than the constitutional one.
· Although the court has since either rejected or modified this position, 187 enough doubt exists that a reasonable argument can be
mounted to the effect that the statutory right requires transactional
immunity, especially since the present statutory right and all of its

181 Under transactional immunity, a witness is granted immunity from prosecution
for any transaction or offense concerning which the witness testified.
182406 u.s. 441 (1972).
183Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1). See also United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46, 60 (C.M.A.
1982) (Everett C.J., dissenting).
184"Pretrial, trial, and post-trial procedures ... may be prescribed by the President
by regulations which shall. .• not be contrary to or inconsistent with this chapter."
U.C.M.J. art. 36(a).
185See generally, Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil. L. Rev.1,
2-9 (1976). But see United States v. Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980), in which
Chief Judge Everett rejected earlier holdings, while Judges Cook and Fletcher stated
that nothing in the case required the court to reexamine the "settled construction of
Article 31" that the Article " 'has a broader sweep than the Fifth Amendment.' " 9
M.J. at 384 (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 23 C.M.A. 181, 182, 48 C.M.R. 797, 798
(1974)). The court has clearly narrowed the scope of Article 31, however. United States
v. Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A.1980); United States v. Lloyd, 10 M.J.172 (C.M.A.
1982).
IS6Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 Mil. L. v. 1, 6-9 (1976). See
also United States v. Lloyd, 10 M.J.172 (C. M.A .. 1981); United States v. Armstrong, 9
M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980).
187See United States v. Lloyd, 10 M.J. 172 (C.M.A. 1981); United States v.
Armstrong, 9 M.J. 374 (C.M.A. 1980).
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predecessors were enacted during the period in which transactional
immunity was viewed as constitutionally necessary to overcome the
Fifth Amendment privilege.188 The issue seems to have been resolved
in United States v. Villines, 189 in which a fragmented Court of Military Appeals appears to have accepted the granting of testimonial
immunity by a general court-martial convening authority. 190 Proposed Rule for Court-Martial 704(a) express accepts testimonial
immunity.
(2). Threat of prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction

For immunity to overcome the right against self-incrimination, it
must at minimum successfully protect the witness against any use of
the testimony given pursuant to the grant including any derivative
use thereof. 191 Even if a military grant of immunity is not binding on
the states, through either Article 76 or the Supremacy Clause, the
Supreme Court's decision in Murphy v. Waterfront 192 would protect
the witness from use of the immunized testimony in a state court. The
same result will follow, however, if the witness is potentially subject
to prosecution in a foreign nation.
The Supreme Court has yet to determine whether a witness who is
faced with a realistic threat of foreign prosecution may refuse to
testify in a court in the United States notwithstanding a grant of
immunity fully effective in the United States. 193 A number of federal
district courts have considered the topic, nearly all in the context of
witnesses granted immunity to testify before grand juries, and have,
with little exception, held that the witness must testify. 194 The holdings have relied on two rationales; first, that grand jury testimony is
secret and not likely to come to the attention of a foreign power and,

tsssee generally E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer, Criminal
Evidence 304-05 (1979).
IS913 M.J. 46 (C.M.A. 1982). See also United States v. Newman, 14 M.J. 474, 481
(C.M.A. 1983) ("our Court has clearly authorized such immunity.")
I90Jd. at 52-54 (Fletcher, J .); id. at 57 (Cook J., concurring in the result); id. (Everett,
C.J., dissenting). See also United States v. Rivera, 1 M.J. 107 (C.M.A. 1975) (failing to
raise the testimonial immunity issue), reversing on other grounds, 49 C.M.R. 259
(A.C.M.R. 1979) (holding testimonial immunity lawful).
191Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).

192378 u.s. 52 (1964).
I 93Zicarelli v. Commission of Investigation, 406 U.S. 472 (1974) (intentionally not

deciding the issue).
194See generally E. Imwinkelried, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer Criminal
Evidence 300-02 (1979); VI Criminal Law Materials 32-11 (The Judge Advocate
General's School, U.S. Army 1981). But see In re Grand Jury Subpoena of Martin
Flanagan, 81 C.V. 3978 Nat. L. J., March 8, 1982, at 2, col. 3 (E.D. N.Y. 1982).
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second, that absent extradition, 195 the witness may avoid foreign
prosecution simply by not traveling to the foreign nation. To the
extent that these holdings are correct as they relate to civilian life, 196
they hardly seem applicable to the armed forces. Testimony before
military proceedings, including the functional equivalent of the
grand jury, the Article 32 proceeding, 197 is almost never secret.
Furthermore, service members are subject to involuntary transfer
to virtually any nation in the world. Indeed, trial may be taking place
in a country with an interest in trying the accused. 198 Consequently,
the civilian law seems inapposite. The Court of Military Appeals was
faced with a case involving a threat offoreign prosecution in 1956, 199
when an accused complained that a Korean civilian witness was
erroneously forced to testify at his court-martial despite his reliance
on the right against self-incrimination because of possible trial in
Japan. In dicta, not joined by any other member of the court, Judge
Latimer stated that both the constitutional and statutory200 rights
against self-incrimination extended only to" 'a reasonable fear or
prosecution' under the Law of the United States."201
The right against self-incrimination is a favored right under
American law. Although the government does have a right to "every
man's evidence", that right is contingent on the right to remain
silent. Where potential foreign prosecution is possible, at least when
that prosecution is a consequence of military service, the privileges
against self-incrimination should apply absent immunity which is
effective to prevent the use or derivative use of immunized testimony

195The possibility of extradition does not appear to have been taken seriously in
many of the cases.
196At the heart of the question is the probability of successful overseas prosecution.
This necessarily requires one to determine not only foreign law but also the probability of overseas interest in prosecution and the probability that the jurisdiction can
reach the American accused. In Flanagan, the witness held joint U.S. and Irish
citizenship and was an unindicted co-conspirator in a plan to ship weapons to Ireland
and Great Britain. The trial judge held that both Ireland and Northern Ireland
enforced their laws implicitly making prosecution likely.
197 U.C.M.J. art. 32.
198A foreign host nation clearly has an interest in trying an American service
member who has violated its laws or injured its people. The United States has
negotiated Status of Forces Agreements or concluded executive agreements with
many host nations which generally result in court-martial of nearly all such offenders.
However, foreign trial is a clear possibility and in some countries for some types of
offenses a probability.
199 United States v. Murphy, 7 C.M.A. 32, 21 C.M.R. 158 (1956).
2oou.C.M.J. art. 31.
201
7 C.M.A. at 37, 21 C.M.R. at 163, (citing Slochower v. Board of Education, 1!50
U.S. {1956)). Judge Latimer's reliance on Slochower was misplaced. See, e.g., note 193
supra.
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in a prosecution in any jurisdiction, domestic or foreign.

c. Consequences of granting immunity
(1). At trial
Pursuant to the Military Rules of Evidence:
When a prosecution witness ... has been granted immunity or leniency in exchange for tsetimony, the grant shall
be reduced to writing and shall be served on the accused
prior to arraignment or within a reasonable time before
the witness testifies. If notification is not made as required
by this rule, the military judge may grant a continuance
until notification is made, prohibit or strike the testimony
of the witness, or enter such other order as may be
required. 202
The Rule thus insures the defense a meaningful opportunity to crossexamine the immunized prosecution witness. The Rule is taken from
the decision of the Court of Military Appeals in United States v.
Webster 203 and its analysis states that disclosure should be made
prior to arraignment.204
(2). To the immunized wit:aess

When the witness has been granted transactional immunity, 205 the
witness may not be later prosecuted by the armed forces 20 6 for any
offense included within the grant. 207 When the witness has been
given testimonial immunity, 208 the witness may later be prosecuted,
but only if the prosecution can adequately show in court, by evidence,209 that the government has not relied on the immunized tes-

202Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(2).
2o31 M.J. 216 (C.M.A. 1975).
204
Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 1969, Analysis of Rule 301(c)(2), reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-11.
2°5See generally text accompanying notes 181-90 supra.
206It is unclear whether the accused could be prosecuted lawfully by a civilian
jurisdiction. See accompanying notes 161-80 supra.
207The accused may be prosecuted for committing perjury while testifying pursuant
to the immunity grant.
2°8Testimonial immunity protects the witness against subsequent use of the testimony and any product derivative of it with the possible exception of the discovery of a
live witness as a result. Cf. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978). Testimonial
immunity is sometimes known as "use plus fruits" immunity.
209 The rules of evidence may not apply to this showing. Mil. R. Evid. 104(a). It is
unclear, however, whether either Federal or Military Rule of Evidence 104(a) applies
in determinations involving constitutional rights.
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timony or any product thereof. 210 It appears from the decision of the
Court of Military Appeals in United States v. Rivera211 that the Court
of Military Appeals will strictly hold the government to this
requirement and it is probable that the government cannot prosecute a previously immunized witness without being able to prove
that the case preparation was complete prior to the witness' testimoney pursuant to the grant, 212 and even then only if the trial counsel
can be shown to be unaware of the nature of the testimony given
under the grant. 213 A subsequently prosecuted witness may raise a
prior immunity grant on a motion to dismiss. 214 A previously immunized accused may not be impeached at trial with testimony given
pursuant to the grant as such testimony is deemed coerced and
involuntary. 215
(3). Post-trial

Within the armed forces, immunity may only be granted by the
convening authority216 or by the action of a convening authority. 217
From 1958 until1983, the Court of Military Appeals reasoned that it
was unlikely that a convening authority would grant or obtain
immunity for a witness who was not expected to testify truthfully.
Consequently, it has consistently held that, by granting immunity,
the convening authority218 and staff judge advocate 219 involved in the

210Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1). See also United States v. Rivera, 1 M.J. 107 (C.M.A.1975).
211 1 M.J.107 (C.M.A. 1975). See also United States v. Whitehead, 5 M.J. 294 (C. M.A.
1978).
212This rule may not extend so far as to prevent use of a new witness discovered via
the immunized testimony, see United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268(1978), although
any logical analysis of the right against self-incrimination would result in exclusion of
such evidence.
21 3Knowledge of the probable nature of a witness' response which permits highly
useful trial preparation should be considered improper fruit of the immunized testimony. See United States v. Rivera, 1 M.J. 107 (C.M.A. 1975).
214MCM, 1969, para. 68h.
215New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S. 450 (1979).
216The convening authority may grant immunity to any service member subject to
referral of charges and trial by that convening authority. See text accompanying notes
161-80 supra.
217When a convening authority lacks the power to immunize a witness because that
person is not subject to court-martial, immunity may be obtained from the Department of Justice based upon the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C.
6001-05 (1976). See Criminal Law Items, Grants ofImmunity, The Army Lawyer, Dec.
1973, at 22-25; Criminal Law Items, Addendum, The Army Lawyer, Feb. 1974, at 14.
21 8See, e.g., United States v. Espiet-Betrancourt, 1 M.J. 91 (C.M.A. 1975); United
States v. Williams, 21 C.M.A. 292, 45 C.M.R. 66 (1972). But see United States v.
Griffin, 8 M.J. 66 (C.M.A. 1979) (disqualification is not required when a defense
witness is immunized).
21 9See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 4 M.J. 8 (C.M.A.1977); United States v. Diaz,
22 C.M.A. 52, 46 C.M.R. 52 (1972).
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grant were disqualified from taking post-trial actions. The Court
repudiated this doctrine in its entirety in United States v. Newman, 220
reasoning that the advent of testimonial immunity coupled with the
adoption of Military Rule of Evidence 607, which provides that a
party may impeach his or her own witnesses, had eliminated any
possibility that a convening authority or staff judge advocate could
be viewed as having vouched for a witness' credibility by issuing a
grant of immunity. The court did not, however, determine the effect
of a grant of transactional immunity declaring, however, that the
"key inquiry is whether [the convening authority's] actions before or
during the trial create, or appear to create, a risk that he will be
unable to evaluate objectively and impartially all the evidence in the
record of trial .... "221

III. CONFRONTATION AND
COMPULSORY PROCESS
A. IN GENERAL
From the perspective of an accused, perhaps the most important
constitutional protections are the Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory process, the rights which, with the right
against self-incrimination, epitomize the adversary system. 222
Viewed in general terms, the right to confrontation gives the accused
the right to be present at trial 223 and to confront the evidence offered
by the prosecution, and the right to compulsory process gives the
defense the right to obtain and present evidence in its behalf. Clearly,
the two rights are interdependent and must be viewed together,
although Professor Westen has correctly suggested that, of the two,
compulsory process is probably more important; the right to present
defense evidence is likely more valuable than the ability to contest
prosecution evidence inasmuch as the former may correct for mistakes in the latter. 224 Were the Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation and compulsory process, both applicable to courts-martial,225
22014 M.J. 474 (C.M.A. 1983).
221/d. at 482.
222A careful analysis will indicate that the privilege against self-incrimination is the
foundation stone of the adversary system as, without it, the burden of proof could be
effectively placed on the defendant. The confrontation and compulsory process rights
supply the tools necessary to make the adversary system function.
223See note 229 infra. See also Confrontation and Compulsory Process, infra note 232,
at 569.
224Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 183 (1974).
225 The Court of Military Appeals has held that the Bill of Rights applies to members
of the armed forces unless expressly or implicitly excepted. See, e.g., United States v.
Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 430-31, 29 C.M.R. 244, 246-4 7 (1960). In addition, Article 46 of
the Uniform Code of Military Justice provides for equal access to witnesses for the
prosecution, defense, and court-martial while providing for compulsory process.
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to be interpreted in a literal and expansive fashion, it is apparent
that present evidentiary and procedural standards would be greatly
affected. At the every least, the confrontation right would constitutionalize the hearsay rule and render all hearsay inadmissible. Consequently, it is not surprising that most commentators have rejected
such interpretation. 226 The Supreme Court, while also rejecting such
literal interpretation, 227 has refused to fully acknowledge the dimensions of the two rights, preferring to deal with confrontation and
compulsory process issues on a case by case basis. The pragmatic
utility of the rights to the defense primarily stems from their
unsettled nature. The adversary system that they protect has been
incorporated into military criminal law by the Uniform Code of
Military Justice228 and case law. It is in the question of how they
affect specific areas of the law, areas which are still unresolved, that
they are pragmatically important and present the able defense counsel with significant opportunities. Accordingly, having examined
the present procedural mechanisms for procuring evidence, it is
appropriate to turn to an examination of the effects of the Sixth
Amendment on that procurement and on the admissibility of evidence. Given that this entire area is a developing one, the focus of this
examination is necessarily on the decisions of the Supreme Court
rather than the Court of Military Appeals.

B. THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
1.

In general

The Sixth Amendment declares: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him .... "At a minimum, the right to confrontation gives the
accused the right to be present at trial 229 to confront the evidence

226See, e.g., Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter
Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99 (1972); note 224 supra.
WE.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980); Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970).
msee, e.g., U.C.M.J. art 46. Most of the usual features of the adversary system are
arguably inherent in the Uniform Code's provisions for counsel, U.C.M.J. arts. 27, 38,
and the right against self-incrimination found in Article 31.
229 The confrontation rights does not extend to the accusation stage of proceedings,
see Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.103, 119-25 (1975) (implied); McCrayv. Illinois, 386 U.S.
300 (1967); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 n.2 (1967); but see Roviaro v. United
States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957), or to the type of sentencing proceedings usually followed by
civilian jurisdictions. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). But cf. Gardner
v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality opinion) (in cases in which death penalty
might be imposed, due process requires that defendant be allowed to inspect evidence
used in sentencing); Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967) (when special sentencing
procedures for specific crimes, e.g., sex offenses, exist, due process requires, inter alia,
confrontation of witnesses). See a/.so Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c). The peculiar nature of
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offered by the government on the issue of guilt or innocence230 unless
the accused has waived that right in some fashion. 231 Presumably,
the framers intended the confrontation right to have some greater
import. The question then is how far, if at all, the Sixth Amendment
protects the accused against admission of various forms of evidence.232
2. The Right to Compel the Government to Produce Witnesses Whose

Statements are Used at Trial
a. In general
Construed narrowly, the right to be present at trial is of use to the
defendant only because the accused is thus aware of the government's evidence; the accused is thereby enabled to prepare and present a defense. If this were the limits of the Sixth Amendment,
however, the government could subject the defendant to "trial by
affidavit" as long as the defendant was faced with the evidence in
court. Yet it has been obvious since the earliest confrontation cases
that the prohibition of trials by affidavit is a basic concept of confrontation. 233 Consequently the Sixth Amendment must limit the government's ability to present its case in hearsay form to some degree.
b. Available witnesses
Notwithstanding the large number of hearsay exceptions which do
not require unavailable declarants, 234 the Supreme Court has not as
military sentencing, e.g., adversarial and an independent part of trial, may require
application of the right. The confrontation clause also protects the accused against ex
parte proceedings which are unauthorized under the jurisdiction's law.E.g., Parkerv.
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363 (1966); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892); United
States v. Reynolds, 489 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1973) (harmless error on facts). However, the
right to be present at trial does not merely incorporate the jurisdiction's law by
reference, but stands as an independent standard of the validity of local statutes that
allow trial in absentia. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
230See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934); Dowdell v. United States, 221
U.S. 325 (1911) (interpretation of Phillipines Bill of Rights).
231 Voluntary absence from trial after arraignment permits trial in absentia. Taylor
v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (per curiam); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d
1202 (2d Cir. 1972). Compare United States v. Peebles, 3 M.J. 177 (C.M.A. 1977)
(absence held to be involuntary) with United States v. Condon, 3 M.J. 782 (A.C.M.R.
1977) (voluntary absence). If there is trial in absentia, the judge might instruct the
court members that they can draw no inference of guilt from the defendant's absence.
The conduct of the accused may also constitute an implicit waiver of the right to
present. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); United States v. Cook, 20 C.M.A. 504,43
C.M.R. 344 (1971).
232For an outstanding analysis of this matter in conjunction with the compulsory
process clauses, see Westen, Confrontation and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory
of Evidence for Criminal Cases, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 567,570 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Confrontation and Compulsory Process].
233See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
234
See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 803 (twenty-three enumerated exceptions and a residual
general exception).
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yet expressly held constitutional hearsay evidence against an accused
who could not cross-examine the declarant235 when that confrontation might have been useful to the accused. 236 Instead, although there
are clear indications that the Court will recognize exceptions to this
general rule, present case law appears to bar admission of hearsay
evidence against the accused when the hearsay declarant is available
for cross-examination. 237 The government thus must produce the
declarant in person before introducing an out-of-court statement
against the accused.2as In determining when a witness is available, 239
the Court has rejected the argument that the government has no
obligation to produce witnesses from beyond its territorial boundaries.240 Similarly, the government cannot rely merely on its regular
procedures for producing witnesses and must make a good faith
effort to use all practical methods to produce the witness in person.241
The government is not required to attempt to produce a witness in
person if it can show the likely failure of its efforts. 242 The question of
whether the government has met its obligation to produced a witness
is a constitutional one, however, and the standard is strict.243

235 Given the general definition of hearsay, see, e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 801(c), a statement
made out of court offered for its truth remains hearsay notwithstanding the fact that
its declarant is present in court subject to cross-examination. When the declarant is so
available, both the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence define as nonhearsay three
types of statements, Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(1); Mil. R. Evid. 801(d)(1), but the general
rule is far more expansive than the exceptions.
236 0hio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 n. 7 (1980) stated: "A demonstration ofunavailability, however is not always required. In Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970), for
example, the Court found the utility of trial confrontation so remote that it did not
require the prosecution to produce a seemingly available. witness."
231/d. at 65. The Court did, however, suggest that there may well be exceptions as it
declared: "In the usual case . .. the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate
the unavailability of the declarant .... " I d. (emphasis added). See also note 236 supra
as to one such "exception". It seems quite probable that the Court will accept the
clearly established hearsay exceptions-particularly the business record exception.
See note 260 and text accompanying notes 248-326 infra.
238Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900).
239See e.g., Mil. R. Evid. 804(a).
24°Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
241 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968) (recognizing increased cooperation among
prison officials in temporarily transferring inmates needed as witnesses). See United
States v. Davis, 19 C.M.A. 217, 221, 41 C.M.R. 217, 221 (1970); United States v.
Obligacion, 17 C.M.A. 36, 37, 37 C.M.R. 300, 301 (1967); United States v. Valli, 7
C.M.A. 60,21 C.M.R.186 (1956); United States v. Troutman, 42 C.M.R. 419 (A.C.M.R.
1970); United States v. Chatmon, 41 C.M.R. 807 (N.C.M.R. 1970). See also United
States v. Gaines, 20 C.M.A. 557, 43 C.M.R. 397 (1971); United States v. Hodge, 20
C.M.A. 412,415,43 C.M.R. 252,255 (1971) (Ferguson, J., concurring); United States v.
Miller, 7 C.M.A. 23, 30, 21 C.M.R. 149, 156 (1956).
242 Compare Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972) and United States v. Daniels, 23
C.M.A. 94, 48 C.M.R. 655 (C.M.A. 1974) with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
243See United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.1974).
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Although it could be argued that the confrontation clause would
allow the government to try a defendant by affidavit as long as the
witness was present at trial for defense cross-examination, the Court
has repeatedly implied that, before the government will be permitted to use out-of-court statements of an available witness, the
government must first call the witness 244 during its case-in-chief and
attempt to obtain the testimony directly from the witness under oath
and in the presence of the jury. 245 Though reliability would exist if
the government presented its case in hearsay form while allowing
the defendant to call the declarant as witness, there are sound reasons for requiring the government to present its evidence via direct
examination. If hearsay were used as part of the government's presentation, for example, the jury could be left with an initial impression not easily erasable by defense examination of the declarant after
the prosecution rested. 246 In addition, the defendant would be placed
in the difficult position of having to call us a defense witness a person
whose testimony is likely to be adverse. 247

c. Unavailable witnesses
(1). In general

The confrontation right necessarily asks whether the government
is estopped from introducing out-of-court statements by witnesses
who are unavailable for courtroom examination. If confrontation
includes such a rule, it would presuppose "that evidence in any form
other than direct testimony is too unr.eliable ever to be used against
the accused in a criminal proceeding."248 Not only would confrontation contain procedural guarantees, but the concept would imply
that a substantive constitutional standard governs admissibility of
evidence. Rejecting this approach, the Supreme Court has suggested
that the state may use out-of-courts statements as long as the prosecution cannot produce the evidence in a more reliable form. In Mattox v. United States, 249 the Court allowed various statements, prior

244 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring in result);
Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses
Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 108, 143 (1972).
245 Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
246See United States v. Oates, 560 F .2d 45, 82 n.39 (2d Cir. 1977); Westen, supra note
232, at 578-79.
247 The problem is mitigated in part by allowing the witness' credibility to be
impeached by any party, including the party calling him. Mil. R. Evid. 607. See Fed.
R. Evid. 607, Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 266-67 (1972).
24SConfrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 583.
249159 u.s. 237 (1895).

44

HeinOnline -- 101 Mil. L. Rev. 44 1983

1983]

COMPULSORY PROCESS AND CONFRONTATION

recorded testimony and a dying declaration, to be used against the
defendant after the prosecution showed that the declarant was dead
and that the evidence was unavailable in a more reliable form. 250
Similarly, in California v. Green, 251 the Court held that the state
could use testimony given at a preliminary hearing once the prosecution had attempted and failed to obtain the testimony from the
witness on direct examination. In Ohio v. Roberts, 252 testimony given
by the witness at a preliminary hearing was held admissible after
the state had shown that the witness was unavailable. When the
evidence in the out-of-court statement has been available and producible in the more reliable form of in-court testimony, the confrontation clause has barred use of the out-of-court statement. 253 One series
of cases precludes use of an out-of-court statement when the declarant could not be cross-examined because of physical absence from
the courtroom. However, examination of these cases reveal that
prosecutorial neglect or misconduct caused the witness' unavailability,254 suggesting an underlying due process violation. In a second
series of decisions, out-of-court statements have been excluded when
the declarant, though physically present, asserted the right against

See Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899).
251399 u.s. 149 (1970).
252448 u.s. 56 (1980).
253 The standard to be applied in determining availability is unclear. In Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980), the Court quoted Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724,
725 (1968), for the proposition that a "witness is not 'unavailable' for purposes of ... the
exception to the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have
made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial." (emphasis added in Ohio v.
Roberts). Having declared that no effort to obtain a witness need be made when there
is clearly no possibility of doing so successfully, such as in the event of death of the
witness, the Court stated:
But if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures
might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand
their effectuation. "The lengths to which the prosecution must go to
produce a witness ... is a question of reasonabledness." California v.
Green 299 U.S. at 189, n. 22 (concurring opinion citing Barber v. Page,
supra).
448 U.S. at 74 (emphasis in the original). Given that Justice Brennan dissented in
Ohio v. Roberts on the ground that the government failed to make a bonafide search to
find the missing hearsay declarant, 448 U.S. at 79-82, it is apparent that the mere
possibility of obtaining the declarant is not enough to prevent use of the hearsay
declaration authored by the missing witness. On the other hand, the dissent seems to
necessarily conclude that the government did not in fact make a good faith effort to
find the witness. Given this view of the facts, the proper interpretation of the majority's opinion is at best uncertain.
254
See, e.g., Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314 (1969); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719
(1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965);
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458 (1900); Kirbyv. United States, 174 U.S. 47 (1899).
For the analysis of these cases, see Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note
232, at 584 n.43.
250
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self-incrimination.255 Again, these cases suggest that prosecutorial
conduct played a role and that the prosecution could have made the
declarant available. When the challenged statements were made by
co-defendants on trial with the accused, for example, severance of
the trials might have obviated the self-incrimination issue. 256 Alternatively, the government could have tried the declarants before
trying the defendant against whom the statements were to be used. 257
Finally, if the declarants continued to claim their self-incrimination
privilege, they could have been made available by a grant of testimonial immunity.2ss
The Court has, however, never declared that the confrontation
clause is satisfied merely by offering evidence in its best available
form. Instead, the clause contains a two-part standard controlling
admissibility, regardless of whether the evidence exists in a better
form. Initially, the confrontation clause establishes a rule of necessity: "in the usual case ... the prosecution must either produce, or
demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it
wishes to use against the defendant." 259 Once the declarant is shown
to be unavailable, the out-of-court statement is admissible only if it
bears adequate "indicia of reliability" 260 which "serve as adequate
substitutes for the right of cross-examination."26 1
(2). Unavailability

A declarant can be unavailable because of death, disappearance,
illness, amnesia, or insanity, 262 exercise of a testimonial privilege, 2sa
or because of "imprisonment, military necessity, nonamenability to

255 See Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293 (1968); Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123
(1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965). But see Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S.
62 (1979).
256 Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 585 n.43. See generally
text accompanying notes 400-10 infm.
251 Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 585 n.43.
256Jd. at 581-82 n.38.
259 Qhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980). See notes 236-37, 253supra. An alternative
statement defines necessity as "the State's 'need' to introduce relevant evidence that
through no fault of its own cannot be introduced in any other way." California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 167 n.16 (1970).
2soDutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,89 (1970). See also Ohiov. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66
(1980). The trier of fact must have "a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the
prior statement." California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 161.
261 Hoover v. Beto, 467 F.2d 516, 533 (5th Cir. 1972).
262Mil. R. Evid. 804(a)(3), (4). See also Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980).
2saMn. R. Evid. 804(a)(1), (2).
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process. or other reasonable cause."264
As the Supreme Court has stated, "a witness is not 'unavailable' for
purposes of ... the exception to the confrontation requirement unless
the prosecutorial authorities have made a good faith effort to obtain
his presence at trial." 265 While the prosecution is not required to
perform "a futile act" to locate the witness, 266 the good faith standard
might be met even if the prosecution fails to take steps that offer a
remote possibility of producing the witness. 267 The essential standard is one of reasonableness. 268 Thus, a witness is unavailable when
for some reason, the witness is beyond the reach of the courtmartial.269 However, actual unavailability must be established and
the prosecution must produce independent evidence of the witness'
actual departure. 270 Unless the prosecution has made a good faith
effort to secure the witness, imprisonment does not make the witness
unavailable. 271
When a witness with relevant information properly invokes a

2o4U.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(2), incorporated in Mil. R. Evid. 804(d)(6). See Mil. R. Evid.
804(d)(5). It is unclear as to what would constitute adequate "military necessity."
When the provision was included in the Military Rules of Evidence, its general utility
was considered questionable in view of the procedents dealing with depositions. See,
e.g., United States v. Davis, 19 C.M.A. 217, 223-24, 41 C.M.R. 217, 223-24 (1970).
265Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968).
266Qhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74.
2•7See note 253 supra. See United States v. Bright, 9 M.J. 789 (A.C.M.R. 1980). But
see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972).
266Qhio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74. Compare Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972),
with Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
2•9Although U.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(1), permits the use of depositions when the witness
is outside the civil jurisdiction in which trial takes place or is more than one hundred
miles from the location of trial, the Court of Military Appeals has limited the Article to
civilian witnesses. United States v. Davis, 19 C. M.A. 217,41 C.M.R. 217 (1970); United
States v. Ciarletta, 7 C. M.A. 606, 614, 23 C.M.R. 70,78 (1957). The court's reasoning in
Davis, to the extent that the jury must weigh the demeanor of the witness, 19 C.M.A.
220,41 C.M.R. at220 (quoting Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968)), suggests that
the Article may be invalid as to civilians as well. See also United States v. Chatmon, 41
C.M.R. 807 (N.C.M.R. 1970).
270United States v. Davis, 19 C.M.A. at 224, 41 C.M.R. at 224; United States v.
Troutman, 42 C.M.R. 419 (A.C.M.R. 1970). See United States v. Johnson, 44 C.M.R.
414 (A.C.M.R. 1971). The same analysis applies when the witness is allegedly unwillingto appear. United States v. Obligacion,17 C.M.A. 36, 37 C.M.R. 300 (1967); United
Statesv. Stringer, 5 C.M.A.122, 17 C.M.R.122 (1954). See United States v. Daniels, 23
C.M.A. 94,48 C.M.R. 655 (1974). Compare United States v. Gaines, 20 C.M.A. 557, 43
C.M.R. 397 (1971) and United States v. Hodge, 20 C.M.A. 412, 43 C.M.R. 252 (1971)
(dictum) (unavailability caused by the discharge of witness at government's convenience), with United States v. Dempsey, 2 M.J. 242 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976) (witness was
expected to appear at trial; government did not cause unavailability).
271 Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
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privilege against testifying, 272 the witness is unavailable. Such a
situation can present either a confrontation or compulsory process
issue. If the government can remedy the reason for the exericse of the
privilege, as by granting immunity to a defense witness who has
exercised the right against self-incrimination, a compulsory process
is presented. When the government offers the hearsay statement of a
witness who will not be subject to cross-examination, a confrontation
issue is posed. It is, however, almost always the exercise of a witness'
privilege against self-incrimination which results in litigation. The
conflict could be obviated by giving the witness testimonial immunity. 273 However, the courts have been extremely reluctant to compel
the government to provide use immunity to a witness not yet tried.
The grant of immunity has been required only when the prosecution
intentionally disrupts thefact-findingprocess, when there is a violation of due process, when the prosecution acts on the basis of religion,
race, or other discriminatory criteria, or when the potential testimony is clearly necessary and exculpatory. 274 In some situations,
though, the government's interest in withholding immunity is minimal compared to the defendant's interest in obtaining the testimony.
If the prosecution has already prepared its case against the witness,
there is, at most, a slight burden on the prosecution of having to trace
its evidence to independent sources. Thus, the prosecution cannot
claim that its ability to prosecute would be hindered by granting
immunity, and the prosecution should be forced to choose between
granting immunity or striking the witness' testimony.275

272The usual situation involves the privilege against self-incrimination, though
assertion of any testimonial privilege makes the witness unavailable, see Mil. R. Evid.
804(a)(1), and may require any direct testimony to be struck should the privilege be
exercised on cross. See note.333 infra. A persistent wrongful refusal to testify on the
grounds of privilege will also make the declarant unavailable. Mil. R. Evid. 804(a)(2).
See Confrontation and CompulsOr?J Process, supra note 232, at 584 n.43. If joinder is
the problem, severance can be ordered. See MCM, 1969, para. 26d.
273See text accompanying notes 181-201 infra.
274 United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46 (C.M.A.1982); United States v. Barham, 625
F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d
Cir. 1980); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Alessio, 528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897
(D.N.J. 1980); United States v. De Palma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
275 Even if there is no violation of the defendant's confrontation rights, his or her
rights under Article 47 may be violated.
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(3). Indicia of reliability

Before the prosecution may offer a hearsay statement made by an
unavailable declarant against the accused at trial on the merits,
it must demonstrate that the statement has sufficient "indicia of
reliability"276 to effectively substitute for defense cross-examination
of the witness. 277 Although the Supreme Court has failed to delineate
with great precision what constitutes adequate indicia of reliability,
it has stated: "Reliability can be inferred without more in a case
where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. In
other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing
of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."278 The Court has
failed to indicate which of the numerous hearsay exceptions are
"firmly rooted" in its judgment except to note with approval dying
declarations, former testimony which was subject to cross-examination, and business and public records. 279 Because of their potential
importance to military practice, closer examination of a number of
hearsay exceptions are appropriate.

(a). Former testimony
Under Military Rule of Evidence 804(b)(l), former or prior
recorded testimony is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The basic prerequisite for this exception is that the party against
whom the testimony is offered has "had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination."280 This requirement is the "indicia of reliability" that satisfies
the confrontation clause. In California v. Green, 281 the declarant's

276Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,89 (1970).
217See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 70-71 (1980).
218/d. at 66 (footnote omitted). The utility of the "residual" hearsay exceptions, Mil.
R. Evid. 803(24) and 804(b )(5), is unclear under this test. Neither exception is a "firmly
rooted exception," yet both are contingent upon the proffered hearsay being material,
probative and "having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" as
the enumerated exceptions. See United States v. Ruffin, 12 M.J. 952 (A.F.C.M.R.
1982) (hearsay statements by minors held admissible under Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(5)).
279/d. at n.8.
280 Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). The record of the previous proceeding or hearing must be
verbatim. !d. See also United States v. Norris, 16 C. M.A. 574, 37 C.M.R. 194 (1967).
When the former testimony is offered against the defendant, the adequacy of the
accused's representation by counsel should be considered as an element of the "opportunity and similar motive" requirement. Analysis of the 1980 Amendment to the
Manual for Courts-Martial Analysis of Mil. R. Evid. 804, reprinted at MCM, 1969,
A18-109. Direct and redirect examination of one's own witness may very often be
equivalent to cross-examination. See Ohiov. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 70-71 & n.ll; Mil. R.
Evid. 607; Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(1); Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 324.
281399 u.s. 149 (1970).
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statement had been made at a preliminary hearing "under circumstances closely approximating those that surround the typical
trial,"282 and the Supreme Court suggested that an opportunity to
cross-examine would have been sufficient under the circumstances. 283
The Court expanded this into a functional analysis in Ohio v.
Roberts. 284 The declarant in Roberts had testified as a defense witness
at the preliminary hearing and then disappeared. At the preliminary hearing, defense counsel had questioned the declarant in a
fashion very similar to that of cross-examination. 285 Because the
questioning "comported with the principal purpose of the crossexamination"286 by challenging the declarant's veracity, the testimony was held sufficiently reliable for confrontation purposes. 287
As the drafters of the Military Rules of Evidence noted, the unique
nature of Artice 32 investigations288 raises the question of how this
hearsay exception applies to Article 32 hearings. 289Article 32 hearings are designed "to function as discovery devices for the defense as
well to recommend an appropriate disposition of charges .... "290
Merely having an opportunity to develop the witness' testimony is not
enough; there must be a similar motive in each proceeding to do so. 291
Thus, if a defense counsel only uses the Article 32 hearing for discovery purposes, the Rule prohibits use of Article 32 testimony under
this exception unless the requisite similar motive existed.292 While
defense counsel's expression of intent during the Article 32 hearing
is not subsequently binding on the military judge at trial, 293 the
prosecution has the burden of establishing admissibility and the
282ld. at 165. See United States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960);
United States v. Eggers, 3 C.M.A. 191, 11 C.M.R. 191 (1953); United States v. Chestnut, 4 M.J. 642 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977).
283
California v. Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66. SeeR. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern
Approach to Evidence 474-75 (2d ed. 1983).
284448 u.s. 56 (1980).
285Jd. at 70 n.11. Reliability depends on the particular facts of each case instead of
whether the witness was technically on cross-examination. See id. at 7.
286ld. at 71 (emphasis in original).
281Id. at 71, 73.
288 U.C.M.J. art. 32.
289Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of
Rule 804, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-109.
290Id. (citing Hutson v. United States, 19 C.M.A. 437, 42 C.M.R. 39 (1970); United
States v. Samuels, 10 C. M.A. 206, 212, 27 C.M.R. 280, 286 (1959)). See United States v.
Obligacion, 17 C.M.A. 36, 38, 37 C.M.R. 300, 302 (1967).
291 Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1). The similar motive requirement exists to insure sufficient
identify of issues, thus creating an adequate interest in examining the witness. S.
Saltzburg & K. Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 652 (3d ed. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Saltzburg & Redden].
292See note 289 supra.
293
Analysis of Rule 804, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-110.
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burden may be impossible to meet if defense counsel adequately
raises the issue at trial. 294 To obviate this problem, the better practice
is for a defense counsel who is using the Artice 32 hearing primarily
for discovery purposes to announce that strategy during the
hearing. 295
While the typical scenario involves an attempt by the prosecution
to introduce prior recorded testimony against the defendant, the
reverse is also possible. Assuming the prior record is verbatim and
properly authenticated, 296 the accused may want to use favorable
testimony given at the earlier Article 32 hearing. If the government
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the witness' testimony at the Article 32 hearing, the testimony should be admitted. 297 It should be noted that these requirements are inapplicable if
counsel merely wishes to do is to impeach the in-court testimony of a
witness with testimony given at the Article 32 hearing. In such a
case, the evidence is not being offered for its truth and no hearsay
objection applies.298
(b). Business and public records"

Under Military Rules of Evidence 803(6) and (8), records of regularly conducted activity and public records and reports are admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule. The essential requirement for
the "business records" exception is that the record be made and kept
"in the course of a regularly conducted business activity." 299 Justifi-

294Jd.
295Jd.
296Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(1), 902(4).
297 United States v. Henry, 448 F. Supp. 819, 821 (D.N.J. 1978); United States v.
Driscoll, 445 F. Supp. 864, 866 (D.N.J. 1978). See United States v. Klauber, 611 F.2d
512, 516-17 (4th Cir. 1979). Contra Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 657. See
United States v. Atkins, 618 F.2d 366, 373 (5th Cir. 1980). The analysis is more
complicated if the government is not represented by counsel at the Article 32 investigation. See MCM, 1969, para. 34c. Adopting the functional analysis of Ohio v. Roberts,
448 U.S. 56 (1980), the relevant inquiry should be the effect of the investigating
officer's examination of the declarant and the qualifications of the investigating
officer. See also MCM, 1969, para. 34a; Mil. 'R. Evid. 804(b)(1); note 218 supra. ·
298Mil. R. Evid. 801(c).
299 Mil. R. Evid. 804(6). See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183,
308 {basis of exception). The specific list of records given in the rule are normally
records of regularly conducted activity in the armed forces. Analysis of the 1980
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial Analysis of Mil. R. Evid. 803(6),
reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-104. See United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 580, 45
C.M.R. 353, 354 (1972). If the circumstances surrounding the making of the report
indicate a lack oftrm,;tworthiness, the report can be excluded. Mil. R. Evid. 803(6). See
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). But cf. United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. at
582, 45 C.M.R. at 356 (when analyst is called to testify, issue is weight to be given to lab
report, not initial admissibility).

51

HeinOnline -- 101 Mil. L. Rev. 51 1983

MILITARY LAW REVIEW

[VOL.lOl

cation for the public records exception lies in "the assumption that a
public official will perform his duty properly and the unlikelihood
that he will remember details independently of the record."300 These
assumptions constitute the "indicia of reliability" satisfying the confrontation clause in this instance. 301 It is primarily the application of
these exceptions to laboratory reports and the effect of the confrontation clause which has plagued the military courts; 302 the Court of
Military Appeals has held that such reports are properly admitted
under the business record exception. 303 In the view of the court, a
chemical analysis is inherently neutral; the chemist's job is to analyze the substance, not exercise prosecutorial discretion, 304 and there
is no reason to suspect the chemist of bias. The court's conclusions are
subject to dispute, particularly where, as is the usual case in the
Army, the laboratory report is the product of a forensic laboratory
operated by a law enforcement agency. Recognizing that such
reports are subject to attack 9n an individual basis, the court has
allowed the defendant to attack the report's accuracy, 305 both in
terms of the analyst's competence and the regularity of the test
procedures. 306 Later cases have accepted this doctrineao7 and the
Military Rules of Evidence expressly declare laboratory reports to
be a hearsay exception. 3°8 A question not yet addressed, however, is

300Fed. R. Evid. 803(8), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 311 (citations omitted).
The assumption, though, does not extend to the person who makes a report to the
official or agency. See Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 579.
30 1See Comment, 30 La. L. Rev. 651, 668 (1970).
302E.g., United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69 (C. M.A. 1980); United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225(C.M.A.1979); United States v. Miller, 23 C. M.A. 247,49 C.M.R. 380
(C.M.A. 1974); United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (C.M.A. 1972).
3°3Id. Contra United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1977). See United States v.
Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346 (2d Cir. 1978); State v. Henderson, 554 S.W. 2d 117 (Tenn.1977).
3°4 United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A at 582, 45 C.M.R. at 356. See United States v.
Hernadez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Orozco, 590 F.2d 789
(9th Cir. 1979); United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir. 1978); Saltzburg &
Redden, supra note 291, at 612; English, Should Laboratory Reports Be Admitted at
Courts-Martial to Identify Illegal Drugs?, The Army Lawyer, May 1978, at 25, 30.
3osunited States v. Miller, 23 C.M.A. 247, 49 C.M.R. 380 (1974); United States v.
Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579, 45 C.M.R. 353 (1972).
306As one writer has noted, the analyst's testimony will be of little use in most
instances. English, supra note 304, at 31. See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 95-96
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
301See, e.g., United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69 (C.M.A. 1980); United States v.
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225 (C.M.A. 1979). The prosecution can avoid the laboratory
report issue by stipulating to the identity of the substance tested or to the analyst's
testimony or by deposing the chemist. In addition, the prosecution should inform the
defense as soon as possible that the lab report will be offered into evidence and inquire
if the defense desires the analyst's presence at trial. English, supra note 304, at 33.
3osMil. R. Evid. 803(6), (8)(c).
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the degree to which a laboratory report may be used to present in
summary form an expert opinion susceptible to disagreement.
Although Military Rule of Evidence 803(6) expressly permits "business records" to contain "opinions", it is by no means clear that the
Rule is intended to permit circumvention of the expert testimony
rules, liberal though they are. Although current civilian law is
sparse and confused, there may be a trend to admit records of regularly conducted activity containing expert opinion and to leave to the
trial judge the discretion to rule the evidence inadmissible when,
pursuant to Rule 803(6), "the course of information or the method or
circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."309
Inasmuch as Rule 803(6) states tha laboratory reports are "normally"
admissible under the Rule, this approach, for example, would clearly
permit the military judge to exclude a report which utilized a controversial scientific test.
Assuming that the laboratory exception is sufficiently "reliable" to
satisfy the confrontation clause, the remaining problem is what
showing must be made to obtain the testimony of the chemist.310
(c). Statements against interest
Statements against interest, notably confessions in criminal cases,
are admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. 311 Admissibility is
premised on the fact that the statement would tend "to subject [the
declarant] to civil or criminal liability" in such a fashion that a
reasonable person would not make the statement unless he or she
thought it to be true.312 The assumption that people do not make
disserving statements unless they are true underlies the exception sis
and this assumption appears to ordinarily establish "indicia of reliability" for confrontation purposes.314 Particular concern for reliability accompanies the offer of a third party's confession to exculpate
the defendant. To obviate the danger of fabrication, the Federal and

309 See, e.g., United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v.
Oates, 562 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.1977); but see Clark v. City of Los Angeles, 650 F.2d 1033
(9th Cir. 1981). Some courts have required expert opinions expressed in business
records to conform to the expert testimony rules generally, see, e.g., id., while others do
not address this issue. See, e.g., Gardnerv. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 675 F.2d 658 (5th Cir.
1982).
3lOSee text accompanying notes 469-92 infra.
3"Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). This assumes that Military Rules of Evidence 306 is not
applicable.
312MiJ. R. Evid. 804(b)(3).
3l3Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 327.
314See also United States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d (5th Cir. 1978).
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Military Rules of Evidence require corroborating evidence to "clearly
indicate the trustworthiness of the statement."315 If the confession
includes statements implicating the accused, under general principles, the statements may be admissible as contextual statements.316
Yet, there is some uneasiness in "identifying all third-party confessions implicating a defendant as legitimate declarations against
penal interest."317 A declarant's inculpatory statement made to the
authorities which implicates the accused may be the result of a desire
to improve the declarant's position in plea bargaining or a similar
motive.318 While the statement implicating the accused would then
be self-serving and should be excluded as not against the declarant's
interest, 319 a similar statement made to an accomplice could easily
qualify as one falling under the hearsay exception. 320 Thus, any
confrontation issue depends directly on the circumstances surrounding the declarant's confession.321
Arguably, the use of a co-defendant's confession violates the rationale of Bruton v. United States, 322 which held that use at a joint
trial of co-defendant A's confession which implicates co-defendant B,

315Fed. R. Evid. 804(b )(3); Mil. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). See McCormick, Evidence§ 278, at
84 (2d ed. Supp. 1978).
3lGJd. at§ 279, at 675-76 (2d ed. 1972). See also United States v. Barrett, 539 F.2d 244
(1st Cir. 1976) (contextual statements admissible if neutral in interest and giving
meaning to statement).
317 United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302, 308 (C.M.A. 1979) (citing Fed. R. Evid.
804(b), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. 183, 328). Accord United States v. SarmientoPerez, 633 F.2d 1092 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. White, 553 F.2d 310 (2d Cir.
1977).
318United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. at 308. See Confrontation and Compulsory
Process, supra note 232, at 600 n.98.
3 19Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3), Adv. Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. at 328. See Parker v.
Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 85-86 (1979) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Bruton v. United States
391 U.S. 123, 141-42 (1968) (White, J., dissenting); United States v. Oliver, 626 F.2d
254 (2d Cir. 1980); United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022 (8th Cir. 1979); United States
v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978). But see United State v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302,
308 (C.M.A. 1979) (no reason to exclude when confession offered solely to establish
commission of crime by principal, confession was voluntary, and declarant refused to
testify because of privilege against self-incrimination).
azosee McCormick, supra note 315, at § 278, at 83-84; Fed. R. Evid. 804(b), Adv.
Comm. Notes, 56 F.R.D. at 328. Cj. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74 (1970)(co-conspirator
exception). But see, e.g., United States v. Pena, 527 F.2d 1356 (5th Cir. 1976) (no
declaration when declarant may not have believed he was confessing to crime).
321See United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302,309 (C.M.A. 1979). Obviously, if the
co-defendant takes the stand, no problem exists inasmuch as the exception is premised
on the declarant's unavailability. See Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622 (1971); Mil. R.
Evid. 306; 76 Dick L. Rev. 354 (1972). See also United States v. Perner, 14 M.J. 181
(C.M.A. 1982).
322391 u.s. 123 (1968).
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but which is not admissible against B, violates B's confrontation
right and that limiting instructions are inadequate to protect B. 323
The confession strengthens the government's case by evidence that
the co-defendant B cannot test by cross-examination, and the evidence is equally damaging whether it proves the fact of the commission of the crime or the identity of the defendant as perpetrator. 324
The declarant's confession will often be as inconsistent with the
defense, even if it does not explicitly refer to the defendant or of
anyone else, as if it clearly named the defendant; the confession can
factually contradict the defense's theory, or the facts can be such that
both the declarant and the defendant are probably guilty if either
is.3 25 The Court of Military Appeals has avoided the issue in light of
the differing opinions of the Supreme Court, preferring to decide the
question by assuming a violation of the confrontation clause and then
deciding the error war harmless. 326

3. The Right to Cross-Examine the Government's Witnesses at Trial
a. In General
While the Sixth Amendment constitutionalizes the state's duty to
disclose its evidence to the accused at trial and, to some degree, a duty
to present its evidence in the best available form,327 it also protects
the accused's interest in cross-examining opposing witnesses. In
Smith v. Illinois, 328 the defendant was prevented from cross-examining a prosecution witness about his real name and address, apparently because the information was deemed irrelevant and thus
beyond the scope of cross-examination. Reversing the conviction, the
Supreme Court held that the permissible scope of defense crossexamination of a prosecution witness is measured by independent
constitutional standards. 329 Smith reflects the concept that, when
applicable, the right to confrontation pre-empts the normal rules of
evidence. 330
322Butsee Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62(1979) (Bruton not applicable to interlocking confessions of multiple defendants with proper limiting instructions).
324 See United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. 302, 315-16 (C.M.A. 1979) (Perry, J.,
dissenting). But see id. at 309-10. Cf. Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. at 72-73 (codefendant confession less prejudicial when defendant has confessed also).
325A. Amsterdam, Trial Manual for the Defense of Criminal Cases 1-273,-359 to -360
(3d ed. 1975).
326 United States v. McConnico, 7 M.J. at 309-10.
321See text accompanying notes 248-326 supra.
328390 u.s. 129 (1968).
322Jd. at 132-33.
330See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); United States v. Jacoby, 11
C.M.A. 428, 432, 29 C.M.R. 244, 248 (1960); United States v. Speer, 2 M.J. 1244
(A.F.C.M.R. 1976).
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The Court has demonstrated that the constitutional standard in
this context is strict. In Davis v. Alaska, 331 an important state
witness was a juvenile on juvenile court probation. Relying on a state
law designed to protect the confidentiality of juvenile court records,
the trial judge precluded defense cross-examination relating to the
witness' juvenile record and his possible bias. Even though the state
had an "important interest" in creating a privilege for juvenile
records, 332 the Court held that the defendant's right of confrontation
outweighed the state's interest. Davis suggests that the defendant's
right of cross-examination can be defeated, if at all, only for the most
compelling reasons. 333 Although the Court's opinions in this area,
strictly construed, indicate only that the defense must be permitted
to show the bias of a hostile witness, 334 it is apparent that they stand
for the proposition that the accused must be permitted a meaningful
cross-examination of a witness despite local rules of evidence.335
Cross-examination serves three main functions: it sheds light on
the credibility of the direct testimony; it brings out additional facts
related to those elicited on direct examination; and in jurisdictions
allowing "wide open" cross-examination,336 it brings out any additional facts tending to elucidate any issue in the case. 337 While the
standard of relevancy applied to direct testimony can be logically

415 u.s. 308 (1974).
/d. at 319.
333 Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 581. Davis also implies
that cross-examination for impeachment purposes is more favored in confrontation
analysis. See United States v. Saylor, 6 M.J. 647 (N.C.M.R. 1978); United States v.
Streeter, 22 C.M.R. 363 (A.B.R. 1956); Fed. R. Evid. 611(b); Mil. R. Evid. 61l(b);
McCormick, supra note 315, at§ 29, at 58 (2d ed. 1972). When the witness refuses to
answer on cross-examination, then "the accused's usual remedy for this denial of his
right to confront an adverse witness is to have that witness' direct testimony stricken
from the record." United States v. Rivas, 3 M.J. 282, 285 (C.M.A. 1977) (footnote
omitted). See also Mil. R. Evid. 301{f)(2); United States v. Demchak, 545 F.2d 1029
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Vandermark, 14 M.J. 690 (N.M.C.M.R. 1982). The
remedy must be requested by the defense and is invariably granted unless the refusal
applies only to "collateral" matters. United States v. Hornbrook, 14 M.J. 663
(A.C.M.R. 1982); United States v. Lawless, 13 M.J. 943 (A.F.C.M.R.1982). However,
the military judge has no duty to strike, sua sponte, the direct testimony in order to
insure the basic fairness of the court-martial when the direct testimony is not per se
inadmissible. Rivas, 3 M.J. at 286.
334 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931).
335See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. at 320, in which the Court states that the state's
policy in protecting juvenile offenders' records "cannot require yielding of so vital a
constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness."
336McCormick, supra note 315, at§ 21, at 47 (2d ed. 1972).
337!d. at§ 29, at 57. See also E. Imwinkelreid, P. Giannelli, F. Gilligan & F. Lederer,
Criminal Evidence 11-12 (1979). The armed forces is not a "wide open" jurisdiction, as
cross-examination is restricted to the scope of the direct. Mil. R. Evid. 61l(b).
331
332
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applied to facts elicited on cross-examination for use on the merits, 338
the standard is markedly different for facts obtained to evaluate the
credibility of evidence given during direct examination. In that
instance, the test is "whether it will to a useful extent aid the court or
jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and assessing the
probative value of the direct testimony." 339 Questioning for this purpose takes various forms, and the criteria of relevancy are vague.
Close adherence to a fixed standard may limit the usefulness of the
cross-examination, but the dangers of undue prejudice and excessive
consumption of time clearly lurk in the background. 34°Clearly, evidence which is irrelevant cannot invoke the confrontation clause.
However, it is probable that evidence which is technically relevant to
impeachment might not have the degree of probative value of importance necessary to make the clause applicable.

b. The rape shield rule
(1). In general
In one situation in particular, that of sexual assault cases, potentially relevant cross-examination has been restricted by the Military
Rules of Evidence. When the issue of consent is raised in a forcible
rape case, evidence of the character trait of the victim has generally
been considered relevant. 341 In reaction to political pressure from
women's rights organizations and law enforcement agencies, 342 however, the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions now limit the relevance of the past sexual behavior of a victim of a forcible sexual
offense.343 The military approach, codified in Military Rule of Evidence 412, substantially follows Federal Rule of Evidence 412. 344
Subdivision (a} expressly declares that, in any case in which the
defendant is charged with a "nonconsensual sexual offense,"345 the
court-martial cannot admit into evidence reputation or opinion evi-

338 McCormick, supra note 315, at § 29, at 58.
339/d.
340Thus, the trial judge has the power to control the extent of cross-examination.
Fed. R. Evid. 611(a); Mil. R. Evid. 611(a).
341McCormick, supra note 315, at§ 193, at 59.
34223 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure: Evidence § 5382, at
492-531 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Wright & Graham].
343
"[A]lmost every jurisdiction in this country has enacted some sort of rape shield
law." R. Lempert & S. Saltzburg, A Modern Approach to Evidence 636 (2d. ed. 1983).
344 Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of
Mil. R. Evid. 412, reprinted at MCM, 1969 A18-65. The military rule is somewhat
broader than the civilian rule in that it applies to any "non consensual sexual offense."
Mil. R. Evid. 412(a).
34Sillustratwns of included offenses are listed in Mil. R. ~vid. 412(e).
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dence concerning the past sexual behavior 346 of an alleged victim.347
Subdivision (b) precludes admission of the victim's past sexual
behavior unless the evidence is constitutionally required or offered to
show:
(A) past sexual behavior with persons other than the accused,
offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the
accused was or was not, with respect to the alleged victim,
the course of semen or injury; or
(B) past sexual behavior with the accused and is offered by the
accused upon the issue of whether the alleged victim consented to the sexual behavior with respect to which the
nonconsensual sexual offense is alleged.3 48
Noteably, Rule 412(a), unlike Rule 412(b), does not provide in its text
for admission of evidence that is constitutionally required by otherwise prohibited by the Rule. The drafters of the Rule, however,
declared in their Analysis that "evidence that is constitutionally
required to be admitted on behalf of the defense remains admissible
notwithstanding the absence of express authorization in Rule
412(a)."349
(2). Potential confrontation problems

Rape shield laws, including Military Rule of Evidence 412, have
generally been upheld against claims that they violate the right of
confrontation. 350 Nevertheless, the rule's application in a particular
case may violate the defendant's right to cross-examine a prosecution
witness. 351
Rule 412(a)'s seemingly absolute prohibition on reputation or opinion evidence may run afoul of the confrontation clause in a number of
circumstances. The accused might, for example, wish to offer evidence of the victim's reputation for certain sexual practices in order
346"Past sexual behavior" is defined in Mil. R. Evid. 412(d). See Wright & Graham,
supra note 342, at§ 5384, at 538-48.
347 Mil. R. Evid. 412(a). Compare Mil. R. Evid. 405(a) (when character evidence is
used circumstantially, only reputation or opinion evidence is admissible). Rule 412
takes the opposite view, admitting only specific acts and limiting the circumstances in
which that evidence is admissible. See Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 222.
348See note 344, supra.
349Mil. R. Evid. 412(b).
350 United States v. Hollimon, 12 M.J. 791, 793 (A.C.M.R. 1982); United States v.
Mahone, 14 M.J. 521, 526 n.4 (A.F.C.M.R. 1982) (dicta). See generally cases cited in
Annot., 1 A.L.R. 4th 283, 292-300 (1980); Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387,
at 571 n.53.
351 Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284
(1973).
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to show that he acted in good faith and in accord with that reputation
and thus did not intentionally use force or acted under a reasonable
mistake of fact. 352 Professors Saltzburg and Redden suggest that the
peculiar transient status of the armed forces 353 presents another
problem as defense witnesses may be unavailable and opinion or
reputation evidence may be the only form of evidence available. 354
The remainder of subdivision (b) of Rule 412 expressly provides
that evidence constitutionally requires to be admitted shall be
admitted despite the general prohibition on evidence of the sexual
history of the victim. The problem is in determining when the confrontation clause will require such evidence. One possible situation
may occur when the victim's sexual history is proffered to show a
motive for fabricating a rape charge; 355 the rape charge might be
used by the victim to explain her pregnancy356 or, in the case of a
minor, her all-night absence from home. 357 Applying the Rule
becomes more problematic in other contexts, such as impeachment
by showing bias or specific contradiction. In a group rape case, the
accused might claim, for example, that the victim's testimony has
been influenced because she had previously had sexual relations
with one of the rapists. Conversely, a witness who corroborates part
of the victim's story might be biased because he or she is her lover or,
at the least, has previously had sexual relations with the victim. 358
Davis v. Alaska359 may be little help in such a case as Davis could be
read as allowing cross-examination to establish that the witness has
a reason to accuse someone, but without showing that the witness has
a particular bais for accusing the defendant. 360

2See Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 222.
& Redden, supra note 291, at 103 (2d ed. Supp. 1981).
354 Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 222. See also United States v. Elvine, 16
M.J. 14, 18 (C.M.A. 1983).
355 United States v. Dorsey, 16 M.J. 1 (C.M.A. 1983); United States v. ColonAngueira,16 M.J. 20 (C.M.A.1983); United States v. Ferguson,14 M.J. 840 (A.C.M.R.
1982); State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975); State v. Jalo, 27 Or.
App. 845, 557 P.2d 1359 (1976). In Ferguson, the Court of Review held that evidenceof
the victim's past sexual history, coupled with the testimony of a psychiatrist, should
have been admitted to establish a motive for a false accusation of rape. The court's
opinion reviews a number of cases dealing with the effect of the confrontation clause
on rape shield rules and represents a useful resource to counsel faced with this issue.
See also United States v. Elvine, 16 M.J. 14 (C. M.A. 1983) (inadequate offer of proof).
356State v. DeLawder, 28 Md. App. 212, 344 A.2d 446 (1975).
357Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at 574 n.73.
358Id. at 576.
359415 u.s. 308 (1974).
360Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at § 5387, at 577.
35

353 Saltzburg
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It has been assumed that the accused has the right to contradict
evidence of sexual behavior elicited by the prosecution, such as evidence that, prior to the incident, the victim was a virgin. 361 This view
assumes too much; Rule 412 bars such evidence whoever introduces
it and ordinarily the accused has no right to compound the error. 362
On the other hand, evidence of prior sexual behavior may be relevant
to rebut testimony not inadmissible itself under Rule 412.363

The victim's credibility is also challengeable by showing some
defect in her ability to perceive, recall, or narrate.364 Such defects
may implicitly involve proof of prior sexual behavior, such as mental
defects caused by tertiary syphilis. 365 In some cases, admission of the
evidence may be required under the confrontation clause. 366
Impeaching the victim by introducing evidence by false accusations has not received much attention. Under the terms of Rule 412,
this is not "past sexual behavior."367 Admission would seem to be
limited by Military Rule of Evidence 608, which limits impeachment
by specific acts to inquiry on cross-examination and subjects it to the
court's discretion. 368 Notwithstanding the strictures of Rule 608, an
accused's constitutional right to cross-examine in this instance
includes the right to introduce evidence of previous false accusations.369

Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at fi77.
ld. at 581. The commentators contradict themselves at this point, saying first that
admission of impeachment or rebuttal evidence may be constitutionally required, and
then that impeachment by specific contradiction need not be permitted under Rule
412(b )(1). Compare Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5386, at 562-63 with id. at
§ 5387, at 576-77. Impeachment through bias appears to be allowed, however. Waiver
may be inapplicable here because the Rule is intended in part to protect the victim who
is not a party to the case. Doe v. United States, 666 F.2d 43, 46 (4th Cir. 1981).
363
For example, to counter a claim that the rape has left the victim debilitated,
evidence that she later engaged in strenuous sexual activity might be profferred.
When the victim denies a bias against the accused, episodes of lesbian activities
might be submitted as contradiction. Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at
577 n.90. See id. at 581. Clearly, the exception suggestion here should be narrowly
construed to prevent the exception from overwhelming the rule.
364 McCormick, supra note 315, at § 45, at 93.
365 Evidence of disease or physical condition, per se, are not rendered inadmissible by
Mil. R. Evid. 412.
366Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at 577. But see People v. Nemie, 87
Cal. App. 3d 926, 151 Cal. Rptr. 32 (1978) (evidence of victim's prior sexual history
excluded on issue of her ability to perceive penetration).
367 Mil. R. Evid. 412(d). See also Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5384, at
546-47.
368MiJ. R. Evid. 608(b).
369Wright & Graham, supra note 342, at§ 5387, at 580. A distinction should be made
between accusations which are factually unfounded and cases which are dismissed.
361

362
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Finally, the accused might wish to impeach the victim with evidence of past convictions. While Rule 609 would appear to control the
situation, admitting the conviction into evidence, 370 the harder case
arises when the impeachment is by convictions for past sex-related
crimes, such as prostitution or obscenity. Rule 412 does not by its
express language exclude such evidence for it is the fact of criminal
conduct, the conviction, which is important. However, such evidence
indirectly includes evidence of past sexual conduct. Though Davis v.
Alaska3n may appear to require admission of the convictions, it may
not be controlling; some courts have concluded that Davis only allows
use of juvenile convictions for bias rather than for general impeachment.372 Thus, a prostitution conviction might be used to show that
the victim had a reason to accuse the defendant of rape, but not to
merely impeach the victim's veracity. This issue is not likely to arise
as these sexually related convictions are not likely to be probative of
untruthfulness and thus neither admissible under Military Rules of
Evidence 609(a) or 608(b) or Davis.

c. Cross-examination during suppression hearings
Though the accused's right to cross-examine is generally protected
and can be abridged only for compelling reasons, 373 a less stringent
standard is used in suppression hearings, as suggested by M,cCrayv.
Illinois. 374 The Supreme Court in McCray held that the confrontation
clause was not violated when the judge hearing the suppression
motion refused to allow defense cross-examination directed toward
obtaining the name and address of the informant alleged to have
provided probable cause for the arrest. Lower courts have extended
McCray to situations in which valid security interests necessitate
receiving in camera government evidence proffered at the suppression hearing. 375 In such instances, however, a "least restrictive alternative" approach is used; confrontation is limited only to the extent

370Mil. R. Evid. 609(a). The military judge's discretion to exclude the evidence is not
applicable since exclusion is warranted only if the probative value of the conviction is
less than "its prejudicial effect to the accused." Mil. R. Evid. 609(a)(1). Such evidence
is hardly prejudicial to the accused but is only of concern to the victim.
371415
308 (1974).
372E.g., People v. Conyers, 86 Misc. 2d 754, 382 N. Y.S. 2d 437 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1976); State v. Blirr, 18 Or. App. 494, 525 P.2d 1067 (1974). Contra State v. Cox, 42
Ohio St. 2d 200, 327 N.E. 2d 639 (1975).
313See text accompanying notes 18-340 supra.
374386
300 (1967).
315E.g., United States v. Bell, 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972) (when government introduced hijacker detection profile, the defendant was excluded, but defense counsel was
allowed to cross-examine). C! Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 439 (1979)

u.s.

u.s.
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necessary to protect the vaiid government interest. 376 While the court
may restrict cross-examination to avoid "backdoor" discovery by the
defense, it may not limit questioning that is clearly relevant to the
defense claim. 377

C. THE RIGHT OF COMPULSORY PROCESS
1. The right to compel the attendance of available witnesses at trial
a. In general

MSPAGE52
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, the accused has the
same ability as the prosecution to secure "witnesses and other evidence."378 The statutory provision implements the defendant's right
of compulsory process under the Sixth Amendment. 379 Compulsory
process, at the least, means that the defendant is entitled to use the
government's subpoena power in order to compel the attendance of
witnesses on behalf of the defense. In addition, the clause stands as an
independent standard, doing more than incorporating by reference
whatever subpoena rights the defendant has under statute. 380 As
such, the defendant's right of compulsory process goes beyond the
subpoena power and includes not only writs of attachment and writs
of habeas corpus ad testijicandum, 381 but noncoercive devices for
requesting and inducing the appearance of witnesses, such as the
good faith power of the prosecution and the convening authority to

(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (exclusion of public); United
States v. Grunden, 2 M.J. 116 (C.M.A. 1977) (same); United States v. Arroyo-Angulo,
580 F.2d 1137 (2d Cir. 1978) (some defendants and counsel excluded from selected
pretrial proceedings upon request of other defendants who were informants). These
incidents can also be analyzed in terms of the government's privilege to withhold
classified or sensitive information or the identity of an informant. See Mil. R. Evid.
505(i), 506(i), 507(d) (in camera hearings to determine extent of disclosure). See also
Wellington, In Camera Hearings and the Informant Identity Privilege Under Military
Rule of Evidence 507, The Army Lawyer, Feb. 1983, at 9.
376 United States v. Clark, 475 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1973).
377 Hill v. United States, 418 F.2d 449 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
37sU.C.M.J. art. 46.
379 United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 704 (A.C.M.R. 1977).
3S0Wigmore believed otherwise, 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2191 (rev. ed. J.
McNaughton 1961), but the courts have been reluctant to construe the clause so
narrowly. See State exrel. Rudolph v. Ryan, 327 Mo. 728,38 S.W. 2d 717 (1931); State
ex rel. Gladden v. Lonergan, 201 Or. 163, 269 P.2d 491 (1954).
38 1See, e.g., Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724 (1968) (dictum); Johnson v. Johnson,
375 F. Supp. 872 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Curran v. United States, 332 F. Supp. 259 (D. Del.
1971) (denying petition on facts). See also 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1976) (authorizing
writs of haLeas corpus ad testificandum and ad prosequendum). For the nature of
military compulsory process, see text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
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ask a person to return as a witness. 382 Witnesses within and outside
the jurisdiction are encompassed by the right. 383
Though the compulsory process right is extensive, it is not absolute. The government has no duty to search for witnesses whom it has
no reasonable probability of discovering or producing. 384 Instead, as
with the government's obligation to confront the accused with witnesses against him, ass the government need only make a good faith
effort to locate and product defense witnesses. 386 The similarity
should not be surprising in light of the common purpose of the
confrontation clause and the compulsory process clause to secure
"the attendance of witnesses in order to enhance the ability of a
defendant to elicit and present testimony in his defense."38 7 The
defense's right to witnesses extend only to "material witnesses".388
Within the armed forces, the determination of materiality "is not
susceptible to gradation. The testimony of a given witness either is or
is not material to the proceeding at hand,"389 and "once materiality
has been shown the Government must either produce the witness or
abate the proceedings."39o Given the state of military criminal law,
3S2Compare Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968), with Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S.
204 (1972). The results of the two cases can be seen as requiring the prosecution to use
established procedures making it reasonably likely that the witness would be produced, but not requiring use offutile or improbable procedures. Westen, Compulsory
Process II, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 191, 286-88 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Compulsory
Process II). See also United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 705 (A.C.M.R. 1977) (Jones,
S.J., concurring).
383 Compulsory Process II, supra note 382, at 281-98. This is not to say, however, that
a court will necessarily have the statutory or inherent power to compel the attendance
of a witness. See note 116 for the limitations on court-martial subpoena power when
trial takes place in a foreign nation.
384 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). Cj. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74 (1980);
United States v. Killebrew, 9 M.J. 154, 161 (C.M.A. 1980).
3S 5See text accompanying notes 324-37.
386 Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 72
(C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J.); United States v. Davison, 4 M.J. 702, 705 (A.C.M.R. 1977)
(Jones, S.J., concurring); United States v. Kilby, 3 M.J. 938, 944 (N.C.M.R.1977). Once
the witness is found, the government cannot lose him. See United States v. Potter, 1
M.J. 897 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976). Conversely, the defense must use reasonable diligence in
obtaining evidence. E.g., United States v. Jones, 6 M.J. 770 (A.C.M.R. 1978); United
States v. Onstad, 4 M.J. 661 (A.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Marshall, 3 M.J. 1047,
1049 n.2 (A.F.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Carey, 1 M.J. 761 (A.F.C.M.R. 1975);
United States v. Corley, 1 M.J. 584 (A.C.M.R.1975); United States v. Young, 49 C.M.R.
133 (A.F.C.M.R. 1974).
3S7Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 589.
388
CJ: United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 74 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982). See generally text
accompanying notes 48-58 supra.
9
3S United States v. Willis, 3 M.J. 94, 95 (C.M.A .. 1977).
390 United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 385-86 (C.M.A. 1976). Accord United
States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 (C.M.A. 1977). There is no constitutional right to
introduce irrelevant or immaterial evidence. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23
(1967); Williams, 3 M.J. at 242.
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the only significant compulsory process problem is the requirement
found in paragraph 115 of the Manual for Courts-Manual that a
request for defense witnesses be submitted to the trial counsel with
adequate justification previously discussed. The compulsory process
clause, has, however, importance beyond its basic ambit for it would
appear to not only provide the defense with its fundamental right to
obtain defense witnesses but also to provide the defense with the
authority to obtain and present important defense evidence notwithstanding usual procedural and evidentiary rules.39 1

b. Requiring the government to grant immunity to prospective
defense witnesses
Under current law, the defense has a constitutional right to obtain
available material defense witnesses. A particular problem is posed
when the only reason that a witness will be unavailable is because
the testimony of the witness would be self-incriminatory. Most such
witnesses would refuse to testify against their interests voluntarily,
of course, and the Fifth Amendment and Article 31 privileges
against self-incrimination would prohibit the defense from calling
them involuntarily. When the prosecution has a similar problem, it
has the power to grant immunity to the witness392 which grant
deprives the witness of any valid constitutional objection to testifying.393 Although the prosecution could grant immunity to defense
witnesses in order to enable them to testify, it almost without fail will
refuse to do so voluntarily. Prosecutors will point out that bestowal of
immunity complicates or makes impossible subsequent prosecution
of the witness, 394 that there is no way in which to adequately insure in
advance that the witness's testimony is material, and that immunizing defense witnesses would interfere with prosecutorial discretion
and run the risk of immunizing large "fish" in order to prosecute
"small fry". All of these concerns are valid. It may be, however, that
the defense may be able to make an adequate offer of proof as to the

39llnsorfar as the potential conflict between the defense's need for evidence and the
shielding effect of evidentiary privileges, see Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause,
73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 159-77 (1974). See also text accompanying notes 161-221 supra.
3 93 Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972).
394 The prosecution could grant the accused use immunity, Kastigarv. United States,
406 U.S. 441 (1972); Mil. R. Evid. 301(c)(1), under which nothing the witness said, or
any product thereof, could later be used against the witness. However, military law
takes an unusually expansive view of the derivative evidence rule and it would be very
difficult for the prosecution to adequately prove in court that a case against an
immunized witness was actually prepared and tried without use of the immunized
testimony. United States v. Rivera, 23 C.M.A. 430, 50 C.M.R. 389, 1 M.J. 50 (1975).
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anticipated testimony of the witness.3 95 Further, prosecutorial discretion is in the control of the government. If the prospective defense
witness·is a more culpable offender than the accused, the government should not be heard to complain that its own election of how to
proceed has caused it eventual difficulties. In short, in an appropriate case, the defense's right to the testimony of a material witness
should outweigh the government's interest in not bestowing use
immunity on the witness. 396 Thus far, however, the courts have been
extremely reluctant to compel the government to grant immunity to
defense witnesses.3 97 Within the armed forces, the ultimate resolution of this issue is unclear. With a majority of the three member

395A procedure may exist, at least in civilian life, to cope with the situation in which
the defense may demonstrate a reasonable belief that the witness has material testimony but is unable to actually demonstrate the existence of the testimony. Arguably
a judge can grant the witness use immunity for purposes of an in camera
hearing out of the presence of the prosecutor, in order to determine
whether the witness possesse exculpatory evidence. If the testimony is
material, the court can then force the prosecution to choose between
allowing the witness to testify in open court under a grant of use immunity or withholding immunity and thus foregoing prosecution. If the witness' evidence is immaterial, the judge can then seal the in camera
testimony, thereby protecting the witness from self-incrimination while
sparing the prosecution the burden of attempting to trace any further
evidence against the witness to independent sources.
Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 581-82 n.38 (citing United
States v. Melchor Moreno, 536 F.2d 1042, 1047n.7 (5th Cir.1976)). Professor Westen
questions the ability of the court to prevent disclosure to the prosecution. Id, but if
evidence allegedly privileged against disclosure to the defense can be protected, see
Mil. R. Evid. 505-07, the legality of which may be suspel't in~nfar as ex varte in camera
proceedings are concerned, there seems to be no reason why disclosure to the prosecution is any more probable. The issue is further complicated by the fact that, usually,
immunity is granted by the convening authority rather than the military judge in the
armed forces. Thus, the intermediate use of immunity would normally need command
cooperation and it is not likely that a trial judge would threaten dismissal of charges if
the convening authority failed to grant such immunity with the potential evidence
being so speculative.
396 See Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); State v. Broady, 41 Ohio App.
2d 17, 321 N.E. 2d 890 (1974). But the government's interest is established if the
witness is a potential target of prosecution. United States v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769 (2d
Cir. 1980). The granting of immunity to the witness need not be the only possible
remedy, however. In an appropriate case, the case might be continued until the
witness's status is clarified, such as by conviction. But see United States v. Villines, 13
M.J. 46 (C.M.A. 1982) (right against self-incrimination in contested case persists
pending appeal).
391See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 13 M.J. 407 (C.M.A. 1982); United States v.
Herman, 589 F.2d 1191 (3d Cir.1978); United States v. Carmen, 577 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.
1978). For cases discussing an asserted duty to grant defense witnesses immunity, see
United States v. Villines, 13 M.J. 46 (C. M.A. 1982); United States v. Barham, 625 F.2d
1221 (5th Cir. 1980); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Smith, 615 F.2d 964 (3d Cir.
1980); United States v. Morrison, 535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir.1976); United States v. Alessio,
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court sustaining a conviction in which a defense request that a
defense witness be granted immunity was denied, the Court of Military Appeals was badly divided on this issue in United States v.
Villines, 398 a decision consisting of an opinion by Judge Fletcher,
with Judge Cook concurring in the result, and Chief Judge Everett
dissenting. A synthesis of the three opinion suggests that a majority
of the present court believes that immunity can be granted to enable
defense witnesses to testify "when clearly exculpatory evidence is
involved". Furthermore, the decision on such a defense request must
be made without utilizing "an unjustifiable standard [or improper
consideration] such as race, religion, or other arbitary classification ... " and without the intent of making such a decision "with the
deliberate intention of distorting the judicial fact finding process."399
Rejecting the view of Chief Judge Everett that both the general
court-martial convening authority and the military judge may grant
immunity, Judges Fletcher and Cook appear to hold that only the
convening authority has that power. Given the divided nature of the
court in Villines, further litigation can be expected in this area.

c. Improper joinder
Joinder of accuseds is allowed under paragraph 26d and 33l of the
Manual for Courts-Martial. The procedure creates several savings,
notably time, expense, and prosecutorial effort. 400 The Manual counsels, however, that if "the testimony of an accomplice is necessary, he
should not be tried jointly with those against whom he is expected to
testify."40 1 From the accused's perspective, joinder may deny the
defense the benefit of favorable testimony from a co-accused, either
because the testimony would improperly prejudice the co-accused402

528 F.2d 1079 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Lowell, 490 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1980);
United States v. DePalma, 476 F. Supp. 775 (S.D.N.Y. 1979). See generally Note, The
Case Against a Right to Defense Witness Immunity, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 139 (1983).
Though there may be no constitutional obligation on the prosecution to grant immunity
to defense witnesses, but see Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at
581 n.38, arguably, an obligation under Article 46 exists in order to effectuate the
article's mandate of equal access to witnesses. But cf. United States v. Davison, 4 M.J.
702, (A.C.M.R. 1977) (Art. 46 only implements Sixth Amendment rights).
39813 M.J. 46 (C.M.A. 1982).
399Jd. at 55. In United States v. Jones, 13 M.J. 407 (C. M.A. 1982), the court reJected a
defense claim that it was entitled to have a defense witness immunized, stating that
there was no "reasonably foreseeable testimony" beneficial to the defense.
40°MCM, 1969, para. 26d; Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev.
71, 141 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Compulsory Process].
4otMCM, 1969, para. 26d.
402E.g., Byrd v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir.1970).
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or because the co-accused refuses to testify. 403 The principal problem
in such a case is determining if joinder is the real cause of the
co-accused's silence. 404 Such claims for severance are usually treated
with skepticism, especially in civilian courts. 405 The Manual for
Courts-Martial, however, declares: "In a common trial, a motion to
sever will be liberally considered"406 and states that one of the "more
common grounds for this motion are that the mover desires to use at
his trial the testimony of one or more of his co-accused .... "407 In light
of the prosecution's obligation to avoid harassing or discouraging
defense witnesses from testifying408 and the Manual's liberal standard, the accused should not be required to show to a certainty that
joinder silenced the co-accused and, for example, if the accused
shows that the co-accused has already given exculpatory testimony
out-of-court and that joinder could silence the witness, the government should be required to show that joinder would have no such
effect. 409 Severance should certainly be ordered whenever it is more
probable than not that the co-accused will testify for the accused at a
separate trial. 410
2. The Right to be Present for the Testimony of Defense Witnesses at
Trial
There is little, if any, discussion in the case law on the extent of the
accused's constitutional right to be present when defense witnesses
testify as the government is "not in the habit of requiring defense
witnesses to testify outside the defendant's presence."411 The issue
4 03E.g.,

United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772 (4th Cir. 1971).

404 Campulsory Process, supra note 400, at 142-43.
405See United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Buma-

tay, 480 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir. 1973); United States v. Pelion, 475 F. Supp. 467 (S.D.N. Y.
1976), affdmem., 620 F.2d 286 (2d Cir.1980); United States v. Stitt, 380 F. Supp.1172
(W.D. Pa. 1974), affdmem., 510 F.2d 971 (3d Cir.1975); United States v. Sweig, 316 F.
Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). But see MCM, 1969, para. 69d (military practice).
406Jd.
401Jd.

ossee text accompanying notes 460-68 infra.
409Campulsory Process, supra note 400, at 143. See United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d
4

911 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Starr, 584 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Smolar, 557 F.2d 13 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Anthony, 565 F.2d 533
(8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Kozell, 468 F. Supp. 746 (E.D. Pa. 1979); United
Statesv. Aloi, 449 F. Supp. 698 (E.D.N.Y.l977); United States v. Iezzi, 451 F. Supp.
1027 (W.D. Pa. 1976), affd. sub nom. United States v. Boscia, 573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir.
1978); United States v. Buschmann, 386 F. Supp. 822 (E.D. Wis. 1975), a!fd on other
grounds, 527 F.2d 1082 (7th Cir. 1976).
410See United States v. Duzac, 622 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Boscai,
573 F.2d 827 (3d Cir. 1978); United States v. Wofford, 562 F.2d 582 (8th Cir. 1977);
United States v. Bumatay, 480 F.2d 1012 (9th Cir.1973); MCM, 1969, para. 69d(citing
this as one of the "more common grounds" for severance).
411 Conjrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 589.
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could arise nonetheless in the context of the presentation of classified
information. In this instance, the accused's analogous right under
the confrontation clause is relevant. The accused has the right to be
present when government witnesses testify and the right can be
defeated only when the accused voluntarily leaves the jurisdiction
after arraignment or disrupts trial. 412 The principle established
under the confrontation clause applies with equal force in the context
of the compulsory process clause. In each case, the accused's interests
in being present are the same. During the prosecution's case-in-chief,
the accused needs to know exactly what the government witnesses
are saying in order to prepare the defense. When presenting the
defense, the accused needs to know exactly what the defense witnesses are saying so that he or she can better elicit testimony. As a
result, the accused's interests should be infringed only when the
accused forfeits the right413 or for a compelling government
interest. 414
It is not immediately apparent why the accused should be present
to hear his or her own witnesses; preparation for trial should show in
advance what defense witnesses will say. But preparation does not
eliminate the possibility of surprise testimony; at best, preparation
only gives an approximation of what a witness will say and turncoat
witnesses are not unknown. To evaluate the impact of a witness, the
accused needs to the exact substance of each witness' testimony. 415
Furthermore, though counsel is usually appointed now so as to have
enough time to prepare, preparation assumes that a witness is
friendly and can be located. Instead, not all witnesses are on friendly
terms with the accused-the accomplice who turns state's evidence is
the common example-and not all witness can be located in advance
of trial. Defense witnesses then could be hostile in whole or part and
might need to be impeached.416
3. The Right to Examine Defense Witnesses at Trial and to Present
Defense Evidence

a. General constitutional standards
The "most important question"417 under the compulsory process
412See note 231 supra.
413See Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra, note 232, at 573-75 n.18.
414Id. at 589.

415 The cynic would ask then if the defendant will tell counsel. Cj. Y. Kamisar, W.
LaFave &J. Israel, Modern Criminal Procedure 1618-19 (5th ed.1980) (unrealistic to
expect attorney to consult with defendant on every trial decision).
4!6Mil. R. Evid. 607.
417 Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 590.
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clause is whether the defendant's right to compel attendance of
witnesses at trial includes the right to introduce their testimony into
evidence. 4 18 Two theoretical possibilities exist: the Sixth Amendment merely incorporates by reference the government's definition
of "witness" as contained in rules on competency, relevancy, materiality, and privilege or the Sixth Amendment establishes an independent definition of "witness" based on its own standards on admission of defensive evidence. Obviously, arguments for both approaches
exist and there is always a risk of making every evidence question in
criminal cases a constitutional question. Wigmore's view was that
the constitutional rule overrode state law only to guarantee the right
to compel attendance of witnesses, but that the states could establish
rules to govern admissibility of the evidence.419 On the other hand, if
the government is free to determine who is a witness in the context of
compulsory process, the purpose of the clause could be easily and
completely frustrated. 420 In Washington v. Texas, 421 the Supreme
Court resolved the fundamental question by holding that compulsory
process includes both the right to compel attendance of defense
witnesses and the right to introduce their testimony into evidence.
The Court's decision consisted of two parts. First, the witnesses the
defendant may subpoena must be congruent with those allow(i!d to
testify for the defendant. Otherwise, the defendant would only have
the right to subpoena witnesses who could not be put on the stand or
the right to call witnesses whom could not be subpoenaed; either
right alone would be an empty one. 422 Second, and of more significance, it is constitutional law alone that ultimately determines
whether testimony is admissible on behalf of the defendant. The
framers were not content to rely on rules of evidence governing
admissibility but intended to create a constitutional standard with
which to judge those rules. 423 Washington also established the content
of the constitutional standard. The state rule of evidence at issue424
was invalid, not because it was discriminatory or irrational, 425 but
because the government interest was inadequate to justify restricting the defendant's right to present evidence in his defense. 426Admit418 See generally Imwinkelried, Recent Developments: Chambers v." Mississippi-The
Constitutional Right to Present Defense Evidence, 62 Mil. L. Rev. 225 (1973).
4198 J .Wigmore, Evidence§ 2191, at 68-69 (rev. ed. J. McNaugton 1961).
42°Conjrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 591.
421388 u.s. 14 (1967).
422/d. at 23.
423/d. at 20, 22.
424 /d. at 16, 17 n.4. (Texas law made accomplices incompetent to testify for one
another.)
425But cf. id. at 22-23 (rule disqualifying alleged accomplice from testifying for
defendant is absurd in light of exceptions to rule and sheer common sense).
426See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
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tedly, the state had an interest in excluding evidence which probably
was false and self-serving. The Court instead weighed the relative
interests of the state and the defendant and determined that, since
the trier of fact could be trusted to adequately consider the evidence,
the only course was to admit the evidence.
There is some congruence between the Court's view of compulsory
process expressed in Washington and its view of confrontation, as
stated in Smithv. Illinois4 27 and Davisv. Alaska.428 In both Washington and Smith, the defendant was prevented by a state rule of evidence from obtaining testimony from a witness who was present and
ready to testify. Holding that the Sixth Amendment requires the
trier of fact be allowed to give the evidence whatever weight and
credibility may be appropriate, the Court in both instances overturned the evidentiary rule. Similarly, the presence of a legitimate
state interest was raised to justify exclusion of evidence in Washington and Davis. Neither denying the importance of the asserted state
interests nor challenging the value of the rules used to further those
interests, the Court held in both cases that the defendant had a
superior interest in presenting defense evidence. Implicit in Washington and Davis is that the defendant's rights under the Sixth
Amendment are not absolute, but that questions of admissibility due
to competence, materiality, or privilege concerns ultimately constitute a federal question determined by strict constitutional standards.429

b. Competency of witnesses
As both Washington v. Texas 430 and Chambers v. Mississippi 43 1
indicate, rules on competency of evidence may raise constitutional
issues. Generally, though, the constitutional questions about competency have been reduced by the broad competency standard contained in Military Rule of Evidence 601; unless provided otherwise,
any person is competent to testify. 432 The only restrictions on competency are those prohibiting the military judge and court members

427390 u.s. 129 (1968).
428415 u.s. 308 (1974).
429 See Compulsory Process, supra note 400, at 159-77; Compulsory Process II, supra
note 382, at 194-231.
430388 u.s. 14 (1967).
431410 u.s. 284 (1973).
432The Analysis of the Rule states that its plain meaning would eliminate any
judicial discretion in the area of competence. Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the
Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of Rule 601, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-85 to
-86. Other traditional competency questions were also rendered obsolete by the Manual revision. Hearsay, for example, is no longer incompetent. Mil. R. Evid. 801.
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from testifying as witnesses. 433
Under the military rule, a court member "may testify on the
question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the attention of the members of the court-martial,
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon
any member, or whether there was unlawful command influence."434
The Rule does not draw the line at the jury room door but between the
mental processes of court members and the presence of conditions or
events designed to improperly influence court members in or out of
the jury room. The Rule thus distinguishes between subjective and
objective events and prohibits testimony about conduct which has no
verifiable objective manifestations.435 While the Rule correctly states
existing law, 436 there is some suggestion that actual practice need not
be so rigid. 437 Going beyond the Rule requires consideration of the
interests protected by the Rule, when and how the issue is raised, and
the type of impropriety involved. There are two basic interests being
furthered by the Rule. One is the protection of court members from
probing by the defense to see if there was misconduct or improper
procedure. 438 The other interest involved is the need for finality in
criminal convictions. If this type of inquiry were allowed, the verdict
would be subject to constant attack.
The issue of impropriety can be raised by "affidavit or evidence
or any statement by the member" when the member could testify to
the same effect. 439 The issue of impropriety should be raised before
the court adjourns, if possible, and will usually be suggested in this
situation by a member's statement to the judge, counsel, or bailiff.440
In addition, the problems that the Rule is designed to prevent "disappear in large part if such investigation ... is made by the judge and
takes place before the juror's discharge and separation."441
The type of impropriety and its effect will also be important. A
433 Mil. R. Evid. 605(a), 606(a).
434Mi1. R. Evid. 606(a).
4 35 See Mil. R. Evid. 606(b).
436 United States v. West, 23 C. M.A. 77, 48 C.M.R. 548 (1974); Analysis of the 1980
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of Rule 606, reprinted at
MCM, 1969, A18-87.
437 United States v. West, 23 C.M.A. at 81, 48 C.M.R. at 552 (Quinn, J., concurring).
4313See Parker v. Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 369 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting); United
States v. Miller, 403 F.2d 77, 82 (2d Cir. 1968). Given the usual complexity of instructions, it would be easy to establish that the court members misunderstood or misapplied an instruction.
439Mi1. R. Evid. 606(b).
44 °Compare Parkerv. Gladden, 385 U.S. at 366-67 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (petitioner's wife asked individual jurors a series of questions sent to her by petitioner).
4418 J. Wigmore, Evidence§ 2350, at 691 (rev. ed. J. McNaughton 1961).
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juror cannot testify about improper quotient verdicts442 or about
compromise verdicts. 443 Court members may testify about prejudicial information brought to their attention 444 or outside influence
on the family, 445 or to irregularities as intoxication, bribery, and
possession of information not obtained through trial. 446
c. Admissibility of evidence
(1). In general

Even though a witness is competent to testify, his or her testimony
may be excluded on evidentiary grounds. Chambers v. Mississippi, 447
a case susceptible to multiple interpretations, suggests that evidence
rules cannot be applied to infringe the defendant's right to present a
defense. In Chambers, the Supreme Court overturned a conviction
because the defendant was not permitted to solicit declarations
against penal interest-confessions to the crime made by a third
party-because of state evidentiary law. The import of Chambers
was, and remains, unclear. Some commentators have interpreted it
as a unique case growing out of unusual facts and an unusual combination of state evidentiary principles. Others have interpreted it as a
major, if not seminal, case providing the defense with a constitutional right to present important probative evidence notwithstanding normal evidentiary rules. Under this latter view, Chambers is
both a confrontation and compulsory process case and thus one of
great potential value. Although the Court of Military Appeals has
followed Chambers, 448 it has not clearly indicated which interpretation of Chambers it has accepted. Recently, however, the court has
emphasized the need for the proffered evidence to at least be "reliable" for Chambers to apply. 449 Furthermore, the court appears to
have placed some emphasis on the fact that the hearsay declarant in

442McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915).
443Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912).
444 Mattox v. United States,146 U.S.140 (1892); Bulger v. McCray, 575 F.2d 407 (2d
Cir.1978).
44SKrause v. Roberts, 570 F.2d 563 (6th Cir. 1977).
4463 J. Weinstein v. M. Berger, Evidence para. 606 [or], at 609-29 to -32 nn.25-37
(1981) (citing cases).
447 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Chambers is an unusual case. Justice Powell, its author,
expressly limited its holding to "the facts and circumstances of this case .... " I d. at
303. However, it is impossible to ignore the broader import of the case which seems
clearly to be that the defense may present relevant and critical defense evidence
notwithstanding state evidentiary rules to the contrary. See Imwinkelried, supra note
418, for an outstanding examination of the case. Insofar as the effect of evidentiary
privileges are concerned, see note 391 supra.
448 United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 143 (C. M.A. 1977).
449 United States v. Perner, 14 M.J. 181, 184 (C.M.A. 1982).
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Chambers was available at trial, 450 suggesting that the court will
limit Chambers to circumstances in which the declarant is present at
trial although not subject to full cross-examination.
{2). Scientific evidence

Although Chambers has great potential scope, mainly in the hearsay area, it may have particular value in the area of scientific evidence, particularly in circumstances in which the defense desires to
offer evidence of an exculpatory polygraph examination. Before
scientific evidence is admitted, it must be shown to be relevant, i.e., to
make the existence of any fact "more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence."451 Traditionally, this meant for
scientific evidence that the proponent had to establish that:
(1) the underlying scientific principle is valid;
(2) the technique properly applies the principle;
(3) the instruments used were in proper working order;
(4) proper procedures were used; and
(5) the ·people conducting the test and interpreting the
results were qualified.452
This foundation met the authentication and relevancy requirements
and was known as the Frye test. 453 Pursuant to this test, if the idea
behind a scientific technique is invalid, evidence obtained through
that technique is irrelevant. 454 It is unclear, however, whether the
Frye test was adopted by either the Federal or Military Rules of
Evidence.455The expansive nature of the expert witness rules found
in the Federal and Military Rules of Evidence,456 coupled with the
simple definition of relevancy in Rule 401 and the lack of any reference to the Frye test suggest strongly that the test has been aban-

45/Jfd. at 184 n.3. See also United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 143, 147-48 (C.M.A. 1977)
(declarant, who had refused to testify pursuant to the right against self-incrimination
was in the courtroom).
451 Mil. R. Evid. 401.
452See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923); United States v. Ford, 4
C.M.A. 611, 16 C.M.R. 185 (1954).
453See note 451 supra.
454 United States v. Hulen, 3 M.J. 275, 277 (C.M.A. 1977) (Perry, J., concurring);
United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820, 823 (A.F.C.M.R. 1981); United States v. DeBentham, 348 F. Supp. 1377 (S.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 470 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1973).
455Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 457; Analysis of Mil. R. 702. See generally
Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 261, 265-67
(1981) (collecting cases).
456See generally Analysis of the 1980 Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial;
Analysis of Rule 702, reprinted at MCM, 1969, A18-95-96.
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doned. Yet, the test has had such wide currency over the years, albeit
often not followed, that absence of mention in the Rules may not
equate to its abandonment. If the Frye test has not been abandoned,
Chambers could be argued in any given case to prohibit its application to prohibit defense evidence if it could be shown to be too rigorous and to prohibit relevant and probative defense evidence. For the
argument to succeed, the evidence must also be "legally relevant;" it
must not be unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or unduly delaying. 457
Because the compulsory process right to prevent evidence extends
only to relevant evidence, 458 there is no violation of the defendant's
constitutional or statutory459 rights when necessary foundation
requirements are not met and the evidence is not admitted as a
result.
d. Preventing defense witnesses from testifying

The defendant's right to present evidence may be frustrated not
only by evidentiary rules, but also by the actions of the prosecutor or
the judge. The effect on the accused is the same whether a witness is
prevented from testifying because of evidentiary rules or because of
coercion. The compulsory process clause prohibits the government
from deliberately harassing or removing witnesses. Legitimate
procedures may be employed, e.g., advising a witness of the penalty
for perjury or of the privilege against self-incrimination, 460 thus
suggesting that there is a fine line between proper and improper
conduct. Some conduct, though, may be so flagrant as to violate the
compulsory process clause.461
The constitutional principle was recognized by the Supreme Court
in a due process decision Webb v. Texas. 462 While acknowledging the
state's interest in preventing perjury, the Court overturned the conviction on due process grounds because the trial judge had used
"unnecessarily strong terms" to warn the only defense witness about
perjury and "effectively drove that witness off the stand."463 Webb
thus establishes that a practice that effectively deters a material
defense witness from testifying is invalid unless necessary to
457 Mil. R. Evid. 403. See United States v. Hulen, 3 M.J. 275, 277 (C.M.A.1977) (Cook,
J.). See also United States v. Helton, 10 M.J. 820, 824 (A.F.C.M.R.1981); United States
v. Hicks, 7 M.J. 561, 563,566 (A.C.M.R. 1979) (adopting opinion of Cook, J. in Hulen).
4SSUnited States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 242 (C.M.A.1977); United States v. Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 385 (C.M.A. 1976).
459 U.C.M.J., art. 46.
460Mil. R. Evid. 301(b)(2).
461 See, e.g., United States v. Giermek, 3 M.J. 1013, 1016 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977).
462409 U.S. 95 (1972) (though relying on a compulsory process case, Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967)).
463409 U.S. at 98.
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accomplish a legitimate state interest. Webb only addressed the
situation of judicial interference with the defendant's right to present evidence.464 Other cases hold that harassment or other efforts
designed to discourage defense witnesses also violate the defendant's
rights. Such efforts have included perjury warnings and threats of
prosecution or arrest. 465 Although military cases support the proposition that negligent discharge of a defense witness violates the
government's duty to insure the attendance of the witness at trial, 466
the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in United States v. Valenzuela461
places that general statement in doubt. Concerned with the deportation of a potential witness, the Court held in Valenzuela that the
statutory policy of rapid deportation of illegal aliens requires that
the defendant make "a plausible showing that the testimony of the
deported witnesses would have been material and favorable to his
defense, in ways not merely cumulative to the testimony of available
witnesses."46S Although the Court expressly stated, in what may soon
be an oft-quoted footnote 9, that it expressed no opinion "on the
showing which a criminal defendant must make in order to obtain
compulsory process for securing the attendance ... of witnesses
within the United States" and the holding may be limited to cases in
which the desired witness has been deported, the case may be persuasive when the armed forces have properly discharged a service
member, albeit with negligent timing. One can reasonably argue
that the elimination of unfit members of the armed forces is necessary to an effective armed force and that Congress has clearly recognized this via its knowledge and recognition of the discharge system.
If this should prove accurate, no sanction would be assessed against
the government unless the lost testimony fit the test pronounced in
Valenzuela.

464 Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 848 (1976). See United States v. Cool, 409 U.S.100

(1972); United States v. Sears, 20 C.M.A. 380, 384, 43 C.M.R. 220, 224 (1971); United
States v. Giermek, 3 M.J. 1013, 1016 (C.G.C.M.R. 1977); United States v. Staton, 48
C.M.R. 250, 254 (A.C.M.R. 1974); United States v. Snead, 45 C.M.R. 382, 385
(A.C.M.R. 1972). See also United States v. Phaneuf, 10 M.J. 831 (A.C.M.R. 1981).
465
See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 488 F.2d 334 (6th Cir. 1973).
466
See United States v. Potter, 1 M.J. 897 (A.F.C.M.R.1976) (negligent discharge of
defense witness violates government's duty to insure witness' pressure at trial). See
also Singleton v. Lefkowitz, 583 F.2d 618(2d Cir.1978). The defendantmustshow that
the alleged conduct did in fact cause the witness not to testify or to change his or her
testimony. Once the defendant has made a prima facie case of harassment, the
prosecution has the burden of demonstrating the contrary. United States v. Morrison,
535 F.2d 223 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Thompson, 5 M.J. 28 (C.M.A. 1978);
United States v. Kennedy, 8 C.M.A. 251, 24 C.M.R. 61 (C.M.A. 1957).
46773 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982).
468/d. at 1206.
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e. Laboratory reports
In the military, one of the most troublesome issues raised in a
compulsory process analysis is the right to challenge admission of
laboratory reports. The reports are clearly admissible under the
hearsay exception for records of regularly conducted activity, 469 but,
assuming the report is admitted under a hearsay exception, the
question then becomes whether the defense can present evidence to
impeach the report. Commonly, this impeachment is directed
toward the competency of the analyst involved and the procedures
used in the test. 470 The Court of Military Appeals has concluded that
the defendant has the right "to call the analyst under appropriate
circumstances" for this purpose. 471 While the right is uncontroverted, the mechanics involved cause considerable problems.
Generally, a defense request for the analyst must comply with the
procedures established under paragraph 115aofthe Manual, including the implied prerequisites of timeliness and materiality.472 There
is no consensus, however, on the exact standards required in this
situation. The problem stems from the peculiar nature of the testimony involved. The analyst's statements are used against the
defendant at trial and the analyst actually is a witness for the
government even if he or she does not personally appear.m Thus,
when the defense calls the analyst, defense counsel may have difficulties interviewing this witness. 474 If a pretrial interview cannot be
469
United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 70 (C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J.); United States v.
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 229 (C.M.A. 1979); United States v. Evans, 21 C.M.A. 579,
45 C.M.R. 353, 355-56 (1972); Mil. R. Evid. 803(6), (8)(B); Analysis of the 1980
Amendments to the Manual for Courts-Martial, Analysis of Rule 803(6), reprinted at
MCM, 1969, A18-104. See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613,622 (9th Cir.1979)
(Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)). See also United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908, 910 (D.C. Cir.
1980); United States v. Hernandez-Rojas, 617 F.2d 533, 534 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Sawyer, 607 F.2d 1190, 1193 (7th Cir. 1979); United States v. Orozco, 590
F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 1979); Saltzburg & Redden, supra note 291, at 570. Contra
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 66-68 (2d Cir. 1977). See Imwinkelreid, The
Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal
Defendants, 30 Hastings L.J. 621 (1979).
470
See Imwinkelreid, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence-A Primer
on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 261 (1981)
(arguing that increasing rejection of Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923), necessitates attacking the weight of scientific evidence of its admissibility).
471 United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 72 (C.M.A. 1980) (Cook, J.); United States v.
Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 229 (C.M.A. 1979) (Fletcher, C.J.).
472 See text accompanying notes 42-47, 48-58 supra.
473 United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69,80-81 (C.M.A.1980) (Fletcher, J., concurring
in result) (citing Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 604 & n.
105).
47 4See United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69,77 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring in result) (implied in analysis of MCM, 1969, para. 115a); Mil. R. Evid. 806.
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accomplished, the defense may not have enough information with
which to establish the materiality and necessity of the analyst's
personal testimony. 475 At this point, the judges on the Court of Military Appeals apply different standards of materiality, and implicitly, standards of compliance with paragraph 115. Judge Fletcher
ance. 476 Apparently, no formal request would be needed, and the
defense would not be required to expressly show materiality or
necessity. 477 This view assumes that cross-examination of the analyst
is always material and necessary because it detracts from the weight
given to the evidence of the laboratory report. 478 Judge Cook, on the
other hand, believes that compliance with the usual standards is
appropriate. The government must produce a witness only upon the
defendant's showing of materiality and necessity479 and this standard is no different for laboratory reports. 4so To hold that a mere
unsupported request triggers the obligation to obtain the witness
would nullify the purpose of the hearsay exception. 481 The accused's
right to call the chemist is thus qualified by the normal standards of
materiality and it would appear-that, in Judge Cook's view, the
defense counsel must attempt to contact the analyst before trial and
submit a request as for any other witness. 482 Chief Judge Everett
appears to take the middle ground. Recognizing that paragraph
115a serves legitimate government interests, he would require the
defense to follow the paragraph's procedure, 483 but "rigid application
475United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C.M.A.1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring
in result).
476United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225,229 (C.M.A.1980). See United States v.
Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 81 (C.M.A. 1980) (Fletcher, J., concurring in result).
477/d. at 80.
47BSee id. at 82. (C. M.A. 1980) (citing Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra
note 232, at 619 n.143); Imwinkelreid, supra note 470.
mE.g., United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239, 243 (C.M.A. 1977); United States v.
Carpenter, 1 M.J. 384, 385-86 (C. M.A. 1976). In United States v. Davis, 14 M.J. 847
(A.C.M.R. 1982), the court held that failure to order a chemist produced was reversible error. In Davis, the court interpreted Vietor as requiring the defense "to make
some plausible showing of how the requested witness would be material and favorable
to the defense." 14 M.J. at 847 (footnote omitted).
4SOSee United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 230 (C.M.A. 1979) (Cook, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Johnson, 3 M.J. 772, 775
(A.C.M.R. 1977) (DeFord, J., dissenting).
4S1United Statesv. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 230(C.M.A.1979)(Cook, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part); United States v. Watkins, 5 M.J. 612, 614 (A.C.M.R.1978);
United States v. Credit, 2 M.J. 631, 647 (A.F.C.M.R. 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 4
M.J.118 (C.M.A. 1977), affdonremand, 6 M.J. 719 (A.F.C.M.R.1978), affd, 8 M.J.190
(C.M.A. 1980).
4S2See United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 71-72 (C.M.A.1980) (Cook, J.) (counsel was
"remiss" in notcontactingthe witness); United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 230
(C. M.A. 1979) (Cook, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
483United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77-78 (C. M.A. 1980). Judge Everett's conclusion finds support in other cases. See United States v. Williams, 3 M.J. 239 (C.M.A.
1977); United States v. Dixon, 8 M.J. 858 (N.C.M.R.1980); United States v. Christian,
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of these requirements would produce a conflict with an accused's
strategy and constitutional right to compulsory process" in some
cases. 484 Interviewing the analyst may be impossible in some instances and strict compliance with paragraph 115 should not be required.
As under Judge Fletcher's approach, this assumes that the analyst's
personal testimony is inherently material on the weight given to the
laboratory report.4ss
While the views of each judge have merit, there is another
approach that better reflects the issues involved. Instead of combining the questions of the analyst's qualifications and the test procedures actually used, the two questions should be considered separately. In the abstract, the analyst's qualifications should seldom be at
issue initially when the test involved is simple, as in the cases of
counting sperm cells, blood typing, or drug analysis. 486 If the test is
complicated, such as neutron activation analysis or human leukocyte
antigen testing, then the analyst's ability to perform the test and
interpret the results becomes important. 487 Depending on the complexity of the test, the requisite showing of materiality and necessity
in support of a defense request for the analyst should vary. If the test
is a simple one, the defense should be required to interview the
analyst before trial about his or qualifications and to show that the
analyst's qualifications are inadequate to perform the test. The
underlying presumption is that any analyst is capable of performing
simple tests. 488 When the test is more complex, the analyst's ability
becomes more important; not everyone can do neutron activation
analysis. Because the test results then depend more on the analyst's
ability to do the test and read the results, the presumption of competency is weaker and the court should recognize that the analyst's
qualifications are inherently material. As a result, though the
defense request for the analyst should be as detailed as possible, the
standard used in determining compliance with paragraph 115a
should be lower.
6 M.J. 624, 627 (A.C.M.R. 1978) (DeFord, J., concurring); United States v. Kilby, 3
M.J. 938, 944-45 (N.C.M.R. 1977).
484 United States v. Vietor, 10 M.J. 69, 77 (C.M.A. 1980) (Everett, C.J., concurring in
result).
4SS/d. at 76-77 (Everett, C.J., concurring in result), 82 (Fletcher, J., concurring in
result) (citing Confrontation and Compulsory Process, supra note 232, at 619 n.143).
486 Qualification as an expert requires only that his or her testimony will help "the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." Mil. R. Evid.
702. The witness need not be the most expert or proficient in his field. United States v.
Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977) (Fed. R. Evid. 702). Competency in this
situation only involves the ability to perform the test.
481 See Imwinkelreid, supra note 470, at 278-83.
488See Mil. R. Evid. 702.
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A different standard should be applied when the defense wants to
examine the analyst about the test procedures actually used. Because
the test procedures can affect the test results, 489 the defense should
only have to meet a standard similar to that applied when the analyst's competency to perform or interpret a complex test is involved.
Obviously, the defense should always try to determine before trial
what the proper procedures are and whether they were used on that
particular sample. But, in light of increasing evidence that forensic
laboratories are incapable of accurately performing any but the
simplest tests, 490 a court should not be too eager to presume the test
procedures are proper per se or that the proper procedures were
actually used. If in the paragraph 115a request, the defense offers
any evidence that the actual procedures were improper, the analyst
should be required to testify.491
Like many rules of evidence, this approach is based on assumptions about how various scientific tests are performed and who performs them. The armed forces utilize "on the job training" to prepare
many personnel to function within the armed forces. If a significant
expansion in personnel forced hasty training of otherwise unqualified personnel, it would be appropriate for military judges to assume
that the qualifications of a forensic chemist, for example, should be
in doubt until shown otherwise by the government. In effect, this
would nullify the "presumption" that any normal analyst is capable
of performing routine tests. 492

IV. DEPOSITIONS AND INTERROGATORIES 493
Article 49 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice expressly authorizes any party to take "oral or written depositions" unless prohi-

489 This includes careless handling, storage, and preparation of the evidence;
improper procedures actually used; and improper procedures in theory.
490See Imwinkelreid, supra note 470, at 267-69 (citing four surveys). The court of
Military Appeals has presumed a regularity of handling and storage procedures in
the chain of custody. United States v. Strangstalien, 7 M.J. 225, 229 (C.M.A. 1979).
(Fletcher, C.J.).
491 While it may be reasonable to be concerned about the degree of faith to be placed
in an advocate's assertion, professional ethics limit counsel from calling witnesses who
will give irrelevant or superfluous evidence. Courts should be reluctant to assume that
a defense counsel's assertion of relevance and probative value is erroneous.
49 2See note 488 supra.
493U.C.M.J. art. 49 uses the expression "written deposition" to refer to what MCM,
1969, para. 117a and customary civilian practice refer to as written interrogatories.
Interrogatories are covered by MCM, 1969, para.117c.
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bited from doing so by the military judge or other proper officer 494
and Military Rule of Evidence 804 permits the use in evidence of
depositions under certain conditions. It apparent that the intent of
Article 49 was to utilize depositions m lieu of live testimony. 495
According to the terms of Article 49(d) a deposition may be used only
when "the witness resides or is beyond the State, Territory Commonwealth, or District of Columbia in which the court ... is ordered
to sit, or beyond 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing"49 6 or
when the witness is actually unavailable or497 cannot be located.498

is

The Court of Military Appeals has held that the geographic justifications for depositions are invalid insofar as they relate to service
members499 and has strongly suggested that constitutional standards
dictate the same result insofar as civilians are concerned.soo Thus,
actual unavailability is necessary. Whatever the Article's original
intent, the primary use of depositions is now clearly limited to pres-

494 U.C.M.J. art. 49(a). See generally McGovern, The Military Oral Depositicm and
Modern Communications, 45 Mil. L. Rev. 43 (1969); Everett, The Role ofthe Deposition
in Military Justice. 7 Mil. L. Rev.131 (1960). The codal provision permits the taking of
depositions unless the proper officer "forbids it for good cause". U.C.M.J. art. 49(a).
MCM, 1969, para. 117b(1) requires that "any party may request permission to take
oral depositions or, with the approval of the other party, written depositions", and that
normally a request for permission will be submitted to the convening authority or
other proper office in advance. Although MCM, 1969, para. 117b(3) echoes U.C.M.J.
art. 49(a) in that a request may be denied for good cause, paragraph 117b as a whole
appears to place the onus on the requestor, a result seemingly in violation of U .C.M.J.
art. 49(a).
If the case is being tried as a capital case, only the defense may utilize depositions,
U.C.M.J. arts. 4(d)-(f).
49Slt is probable that depositions were intially used to obtain the testimony of
military witnesses stationed far from the situs of trial, see, e.g., J. Winthrop Military
Law and Precedents 352-53 (2d ed. 1896, 1920 reprint), and to obtain the testimony of
civilians who were not subject to compulsory process as no general statute providing
for such process existed. Id. at 352 n.55, 353 n.58. The accused apparently had not
right to attend the deposition, at least not at government expense. Id. at 355-57.
4ssu.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(1). See note 502 supra.
497 U.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(2) (permits depositions when the witness "by reason of death,
age, sickness, bodily infirmity, imprisonment, military necessity, nonamendability to
process, or other reasonable cause is unable or refuses to appear ... "). The current
approach ofthe Court of Military Appeals to "military necessity" in the general area of
witness procurement suggests that, absent declared war, it is improbable that depositions will be justified by military necessity.
4ssu.C.M.J. art. 46(d)(3).
499See note 269 supra.
5° 0/d. Although Mil. R. Evid. 804(a) is illustrative rather than limiting, its express
enumeration ofU.C.M.J. art. 49(d)(2) and silence as to Article 49(d)(2), suggests that a
deposition obtained under Article 49(d)(1) may be inadmissible under the Military
Rules of Evidence.
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ervation of testimony. 501 It was the intent of Congress that no deposition take place unless the accused is given the opportunity to attend5°2
and military law gives the accused the right to attend the deposition
with counsel. 503 Under these circumstances, the accused's confrontation right is protected as the accused is both present at a prosecution
deposition and has the right through counsel to cross-examine the
witness to be deposed. What the accused loses is the ability to conduct
the cross-examination before the court-members. In a particular
case, this loss of demeanor evidence may be harmful, but if the
witness is actually unavailable for trial, the accused would seem to
have no cognizable constitutional complaint. A similar result follows
from a compulsory process examination. Of course, should the witness not be actually unavailable, as when the witness has been rendered unavailable due to reassignment to a military duty that
another service member could perform as well, substantial confrontation and compulsory process problems may result. These matters
should not arise under present law if only because the government
pays an economic penalty for any attempt to use depositions in lieu of
live testimony even if such use were acceptable under the confrontation and compulsory process clauses. Acute problems may result in
wartime, however, given the need for rapid mobility.
Procedurally, the Code requires that reasonable written notice of
the time and place of the deposition be given to those parties who
have not requested the deposition504 and that "depositions may be
taken before and authenticated by any military or civil officer authorized ... to administer oaths."sos The Manual for Courts-Martial
requires that oral depositions be recorded verbatim and normally be
certified by the officer taking the deposition.sos Appropriate objections should be made during the deposition, but the deposing officer
is not to rule upon them; they are merely to be recorded for later
resolution.5°7 Although, absent actual unavailability, the defense
501 See, e.g., MCM, 1969, para. 117a ("Depositions normally are taken to preserve
testimony of witnesses whose availability at the time of trial appears uncertain.") It is
possible to use the coercive nature of depositions as a discovery device except that it is
not likely that such a deposition would be approved.
502
Uniform Code of Military Justice, Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the House
Comm. on Armed Services on H.R. fJ498, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 696 (1949) (statement of
Rep. Elston).
soaunited States v. Jacoby, 11 C.M.A. 248,253,29 C.M.R. 244,249 (1960). Jacoby has
been codified in MCM, 1969, para. 117b(2), which declares that the right to counsei
held by an accused at a deposition is the same as that prescribed for trial by the type of
court-martial before which the deposition is to be used.
50-IU.C.M.J. art. 49(b); MCM, 1969, para.117b(4) permitsserviceofnoticeon counsel.
sosu.C.M.J. art. 49(c); MCM, 1969, para. 117b(8).
506/d. atpara.117d.
so1!d. at para. 117b(7).
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generally has the right to prohibit the receipt into evidence of a
deposition, trial tactics are often such that the defense has no particular reason to object to the use of depositions provided that the testimony of the witness can carry sufficient persuasive effect. Given the
widespread availability of videotape recorders in the modern society
and the armed forces, both trial and defense counsel should make
increasing use of videotaped depositions. 508 Such depositions can
save substantial amounts of trial time, may be edited following the
military judge's ruling on objections, and will convey the demeanor
of the witness to the fact finder. Indeed, given mutual consent, whole
portions of trial can be presented in this fashion. 509

V. CONCLUSION
Like the civilian legal system, the military criminal legal system is
a complex amalgam of statute, executive order, rule, and custom.
Descended from a disciplinary system perhaps more concerned with
certainty and rapid disposition than due process, contemporary military justice provides the accused with protections equal to or superior to that afforded by civilian justice. Yet, like the civilian legal
system, further constitutional change is in the wind as the confrontation and compulsory process clauses of the Constitution not only
weigh in the balance the military's unique procedures for obtaining
defense evidence, but also delimit what the ordinary rules of evidence may prescribe.

508
See McGovern, The Military Oral Deposition and Modern Communications, 45
Mil. L. Rev. 43, 59-75 (1969).
509 0ne entire civilian criminal trial has been conducted in this fashion by Judge
McCrystal in Ohio. Numerous civil cases have also been so conducted. Because of the
ability to present edited videotapes to juries, substantial amounts of juror and trial
time have been saved.
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